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Abstract
Many economies have undergone the process of privatizing their state-
owned enterprises. Recently, however, this process has slowed down in
some economies and has been completely stalled in others. Here we form-
alize the view that this is so because these enterprises are major instru-
ments of income redistribution and, in economies with signi￿cant degrees
of income inequality, segments of the population that bene￿t from this
redistribution would use their political power to oppose its abandonment.
We ￿nd strong empirical support for this hypothesis using cross-country
data on the relative size of the state-owned-enterprise sector. We also ￿nd
robust evidence that left-wing (vis-￿-vis right-wing) governments are asso-
ciated with greater redistribution in more unequal societies. Further, this
e⁄ect is non-linear, implying that redistribution becomes more costly at
higher levels of inequality. We also ￿nd the same result for authoritarian
(vis-￿-vis democratic) governments.
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11 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a widespread attempt in developing countries to
dismantle one of their most entrenched institutions - the state owned enterprises
(SOEs). Given the extensive discussion on privatization and the huge literature
that followed, one might be tempted to conclude that SOEs have mostly disap-
peared from the economic scene. However, the rumors of their demise have been
greatly exaggerated. A recent survey reports that the share of SOEs in GDP
of middle income countries remains around 6 percent (compared to the pre-
privatization share of 10 percent).1 After more than a decade of privatization,
Mexico ￿a success story ￿still had more than two-thirds of its SOEs intact.
This paper tries to formalize, in the simplest analytical terms possible, a popu-
lar, but as yet informal, argument as to why some countries ￿nd it very di¢ cult
to privatize their SOEs and to test this argument empirically. Simply put, the
argument is that the SOE sector has become a major instrument of income re-
distribution especially for countries undergoing a taxing structural adjustment.
In the words of an acute observer writing about Turkey, ￿... the privatization
drive ... has lost its attractiveness to the extent that it would impede the state
from using the SOEs to ease the pain of other components of the structural
adjustment process.￿ 2
The SOEs owe their genesis to the adoption of strategies of import-substituting
industrialization.3 In some cases these policies had been implemented quite
early. For instance, in Turkey the SOE sector dates back to the late 1920￿ s, in
Mexico to the 1930￿ s, in India to the late 1940￿ s. In most cases the common
ostensible rationale for establishing SOEs was that the exsting private sector
was weak, unable to compete with foreign goods or prone to the formation of
alliances with foreign capital to the detriment of national interests. It soon
became clear to economists and policy-makers alike that the performance of
the SOE sector left something to be desired: SOEs experienced chronic losses
which resulted in rising domestic budget de￿cits and in￿ ation. The response was
attempts at rationalizing and streamlining the SOE sector. This soon proved
dii¢ cult.
In order to explain why such attempts were doomed to fail, we will focus
in what follows on two main factors that contribute to the losses commonly
registered in the SOEs: high wages to SOE employees and ￿surplus labor￿ .
First, a clari￿cation. When we say the SOEs pay high wages we mean that
the SOEs typically pay wages that are higher than those paid by private enter-
prises in a given country. It is frequently the case that SOEs are monopolies and
labor unions negotiate high wages without fearing a depression in wages caused
by attraction of labor to SOEs from competing private ￿rms. The SOEs may
1See Megginson and Netter (2001).
2See Waterbury (1992, p.194). Megginson and Netter (2001) point out that the main
obstacle to the privatization of the Chinese SOEs is the ￿social welfare responsibilities￿they
shoulder.
3The genesis of the SOE sector may in addition re￿ect the need for income redistribution.
Waterbury (1993, p. 263) stresses that ￿...the political logic that gave rise to the SOE sectors
in the ￿rst place [was] the need to redistribute income...￿
2also pay a compensating wage di⁄erential when they operate in locations where
private ￿rms may be reluctant to locate. The full compensation package of the
SOEs may include superior leave privileges and retirement bene￿ts. Further-
more, even if wage rates in the SOEs are similar to those o⁄ered by private ￿rms,
given the low productivity endemic in the former, the ratio of wages to marginal
productivity of labor is higher. Finally, there is strong empirical evidence from
Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia that supports the observation that
the SOEs pay high wages.4
Second, casual empiricism as well as careful empirical studies suggest that
the SOEs carry ￿surplus labor￿ , that is, they employ more workers than their op-
erations would justify on strictly rational economic grounds.5 Thus, for instance,
an o¢ cial study found that though the output of the SOEs in the Western and
Mid-Western states of Nigeria remained unchanged in the period 1963-1967,
the wages and salaries￿bill more than doubled.6 Complaints by management
of surplus workers in the SOEs in Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, India, and
Britain, inter alia, are well documented.7
It is, therefore, not surprising that the SOEs su⁄er from chronic losses given
the wages they pay and the surplus labor with which they operate. And, they
do so because they are instruments of income redistribution. Furthermore, this
redistributive tool seems not to be shunned by governments either on the left
or on the right (though as we show below not to the same extent), by govern-
ments democratic or dictatorial. Thus, for instance in Bolivia which is ruled by
the left-wing MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria) ￿[b]y the early
1960s a form of state capitalism developed, controlled and exploited by vari-
ous competing groups of the middle classes ... [T]he state enterprises became
a source of enrichment for these private factions, some civilian and some mil-
itary.￿ 8 Under the right-wing rule of General Hugo Banzer, who was installed
as president of Bolivia following a coup d￿ etat in August 1971, ￿...the public
enterprises served frequently as a mechanism to transfer state-owned (or state-
guaranteed) resources to privileged groups in the private sector. Access to
government o¢ cials and government contracts was considered the most import-
ant asset from the viewpoint of many private-sector businessmen.￿ 9 Further,
￿[i]n fact, a non-negligible part of the support for the Banzer government and
succeeding military regimes was the willingness to create employment in the
public sector. The return to democracy in 1982 was also accompanied by a
big spurt in the expansion of jobs in the most important public enterprises,
particularly in COMIBOL.￿ 10 When in 1970 the Mexican president Diaz Ordaz
had to choose his successor unilaterally, the new president ￿... Echeverria faced
4For the evidence see Ramanadham (1988), ch.2.
5See, among others, Lin et al. (1998), Majumdar (1998), Bertero and Rondi (2000),
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), and Dong and Putterman (2003).
6See the Report of the Conference on Public Enterprises in Nigeria (1970), cited in Raman-
adham (1988).
7See Ramanadham (1988).
8See Morales and Sachs (1989), p.180.
9See Morales and Sachs (1989), pp.192-193.
10Ibid. p.197.
3the di¢ cult task of creating his own supporting coalition after assuming o¢ ce.
The simplest method of shoring up the weakening political consensus was to
spend on everyone￿ s behalf: dole out subsidies to education and agriculture,
increase government jobs for the middle classes, grant large wage increases to
mollify organized labor, etc. ... Between 1970 and 1976, the number of federal
government employees doubled and the growth rate of general government em-
ployment averaged 10.8 percent. A series of large wage hikes after 1972 further
in￿ ated the government wage bill.￿ 11
In what follows we thus take it for granted that the SOEs are used to redis-
tribute income.12 The question that remains to be answered then is: Under what
conditions are they an acceptable means of income redistribution? Our formal
model yields an answer to that question, namely, that capital-poor agents prefer
more redistribution through the SOE sector than capital-rich agents. There are
two ways to interpret this result. One would emphasize that as long as the me-
dian wealth is less than the average wealth the majority of the population will
prefer to establish an SOE sector to redistribute income. In a democratic setting
with majority voting this implies, under certain conditions, that we can invoke
the median-voter theorem to suggest that an SOE sector would be established
for redistributive purposes.13 Otherwise, we surmise that the preferences of the
majority would, through other unspeci￿ed channels, ￿nd expression in policies
that favor redistribution through the SOEs. These channels may take the form
of a desire on the part of dictators (as in the case of Banzer in Bolivia) or auto-
crats (as in the case of Echeverria in Mexico) to ￿nd popular support for their
rule. A corollary to this reasoning is that the more unequal the distribution of
wealth (as measured by the di⁄erence between median and average wealth) the
more extensive will be the SOE sector.
A second way of interpreting our theoretical result is that pro-labor govern-
ments whose constituents are workers and need their political support would be
more likely to use the SOE sector for redistribution.14 It is also possible that
such pro-labor left-wing governments place a higher weight on egalitarianism.
Pro-capital right-wing governments, on the other hand would be more likely to
adopt policies that re￿ ect the preferences of their capital-rich constituents and
11See Bu¢ e (1989), p. 420.
12Here we do not deal with the question as to why they are used as a tool of redistribution
when there are more e¢ cient tools. One possible answer to this question is that the lack
of transparency in generating redistribution through nonmonetary transfers makes SOEs a
politically e¢ cient tool. See Coate and Morris (1995) for a formal model that shows that
politicians would prefer to redistribute via public works rather than cash transfers when
voters lack information.
13The median voter approach has been the target of empirical inquiry in a wide variety of
contexts. For a study that ￿nds strong empirical support for the median voter approach to
trade policy determination, see Dutt and Mitra (2002).
14Shleifer and Vishny (1994) provide a model where, because ￿the public is disorganized￿
politicians cater to interest groups rather than the median voter. Among others, Claessens
and Djankov (1998) ￿nd empirical support for this view using data from seven central and
eastern European countries.
4choose smaller SOE sectors and less redistribution.15;16 Such an interpretation
would be consistent with the approaches of Hibbs (1977) and Alesina (1987) in a
macroeconomic setting or with that of Dutt and Mitra (2005) in an international
trade framework.17
We also empirically test the hypotheses formulated in the theoretical model
using both cross-sectional and panel data. In the broadest setting we measure
the relative size of the SOE sector in three di⁄erent ways: the share of the SOE
production in GDP, their share in nonagricultural GDP, and their share in total
investment. Our measure of inequality is income Gini, with the alternatives
also considered. Across most measures we ￿nd empirical support in favor of our
hypothesis that an increase in inequality is associated with a larger SOE sec-
tor. Further, we ￿nd that this e⁄ect is non-linear, rather than linear. However,
statistically stronger results are associated with political ideology. We ￿nd that
left-wing governments are involved with greater redistribution through SOEs,
compared to right-wing governments. In addition, center-wing governments
and governments whose political ideologies cannot be clearly speci￿ed generally
tend to use redistribution more often as a policy tool, relative to right-wing
governments. Thus, our results suggest a strong divide between right-wing and
non-right-wing governments in terms of approach to redistribution. Further-
more, the political ideology channel also works in a non-linear fashion. That
is, non-right-wing governments are involved with redistribution at a decreasing
rate. This is intuitive in that redistribution may become costly to society at
higher levels of inequality.18 These results are robust in relation to how political
ideology is measured.19
15As Dutt and Mitra (2005) point out, this line of reasoning could be couched in terms of
the approach in Grossman and Helpman (1994) who use their political-contributions approach
to provide micro foundations to the political-support function approach. Thus, suppose that
the government￿ s objective function (sometimes called the political-support function) is a
weighted sum of the welfare of workers and capitalists. One can then think of a switch from a
left-wing to a right-wing government here as re￿ecting a rise in the weight of capitalists in the
government￿ s maximand due, perhaps, to higher contributions by the latter. Furthermore,
the political-contributions approach of Grossman and Helpman (1994) can be derived from a
model of electoral competition (Grossman and Helpman, 1996), where it is possible for party
platforms to remain divergent.
16Bortolotti et al. (2003) ￿nd that right-wing governments are more likely to privatize, but
this e⁄ect is signi￿cant with cross-sectional data and insigni￿cant with panel data.
17Hibbs (1977) argues that politicians are ￿partisan￿. Left-wing and right-wing govern-
ments have di⁄erent objective functions and shows that countries and periods with left-wing
governments had lower unemployment and higher in￿ation than others. In the rational par-
tisan theory of Alesina (1987) the left-wing party attaches a higher weight to unemployment
relative to in￿ation. Hibbs and Vasilatos (1982) and Hibbs, Rivers, and Vasilatos (1982) ￿nd
that blue-collar groups are typically more concerned about unemployment while the major
concern of their white-collar counterparts is in￿ation. Dutt and Mitra (2005) ￿nd strong
and robust support for the hypothesis of a partisan, ideology-based model in that left-wing
governments adopt more protectionist trade policies in capital-rich countries, but adopt more
pro-trade policies in labor-rich countries, than in right-wing ones.
18Dutt and Mitra (2005) also ￿nd strong empirical support for the hypothesis that left-wing
governments tend to redistribute more via trade policy than right-wing governments.
19It is also worth noting that our empirical ￿ndings are also consistent with the literature
that emphasizes the concept of common property and the attempt by di⁄erent groups in
5In addition, we test whether democracies are more prone than dictatorships
to redistribute income through the use of the SOE sector. We ￿nd that author-
itarian governments are involved with higher redistribution, and, again, this
e⁄ect is non-linear. This ￿nding is consistent with Alesina and Rodrik (1994)
who show that when it comes to distributional issues even dictators bow to
popular will. This result is also related to the view advanced in Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000), who derive a non-monotonic relationship between inequality
and democracy. Note that democracy for them is essentially a tool for redis-
tribution (with commitment). For low levels of inequality, higher inequality is
associated with ￿more￿democracy (redistribution), but further increases in in-
equality lead to less democracy (redistribution). Here the causation goes from
inequality to democracy. We address this point by using initial levels of demo-
cracy in our analysis, and arrive at the same general conclusion as Acemoglu
and Robinson: whether measured by democracy or SOE sector size, higher in-
equality is associated with higher redistribution, and this e⁄ect is non-linear.20
Further, we also check whether we can replicate for the SOEs the result
obtained by Pagano and Volpin (2005) that once the electoral systems and
legal origins are controlled for, the political ideology of the government ceases
to have explanatory power for cross-country di⁄erences in employment protec-
tion.21 Controlling for proportional (vs majoritarian) electoral systems, the
political ideology of the government, and the origin of the legal system in our
models does not change our main results relating to left-wing and unspeci￿ed-
wing governments.
To sum up, the contribution of our paper to the literature is twofold. First it
sets up a simple theoretical framework to establish formally the idea that SOEs
will be used to redistribute income when inequality is su¢ ciently pronounced.
Secondly, the paper contributes to the empirical literature on redistribution, on
the role of political ideology, with and without democracy, and the continued
struggle related to the privatization of state owned enterprises.
In section 2, we set up the theoretical model. Section 3 describes the empir-
ical testing, while the last section provides some concluding remarks.
2 Model
In this section we formulate the simplest possible model that conveys the propos-
ition that SOEs may be used as a redistributive mechanism. To do so consider an
societies to appropriate the common property (See, for instance, Tornell and Velasco (1992)
and Benhabib and Rustichini (1996)). These models are said to apply to societies where there
is ￿extreme inequality￿. If the resources of the SOEs are viewed as common property by the
￿various competing groups of the middle classes￿then our ￿ndings should be interpreted as
also giving empirical support to the common property notion and the models built to elucidate
it.
20We do not ￿nd this e⁄ect when we use democracy as the average of sample period, a result
which con￿rms indirectly the Acemoglu-Johnson conjecture that inequality and democracy are
non-monotonically related.
21See also Botero et al. (2004) for a similar result concerning the regulation of labor.
6economy populated by L households all endowed with a single unit of labor and
varying amounts of capital. The economy may potentially produce three goods
in three di⁄erent sectors. For analytical simplicity, one could either imagine the
economy under consideration to be closed - in which case we will assume that
the goods are perfect substitutes in consumption with their relative price ￿xed
at unity - or that it is a small open economy - in which case the parametrically
given relative prices are again normalized to unity with an appropriate choice of
units. We now turn to a detailed discussion of the production side of the model.
2.1 Production
The ￿rst of the three sectors will be called the ￿formal sector￿ . This sector
functions as the ￿modern￿ , industrialized sector in the model. It uses capital
and labor to produce a consumption good under a constant-returns-to-scale
technology in a perfectly competitive market. The output of this good is given
by:
Qp = F(K;Lp) (1)
where the production function F(￿;￿) possesses the usual neo-classical properties
and K and Lp denote the capital (physical and/or human) and labor employed
in the sector under consideration.22
The second sector is labeled the ￿informal sector￿ . Agents employed in
this perfectly competitive sector have access to a Ricardian technology with a
constant input-output coe¢ cient 1=￿ and produce a consumption good using
labor alone. The labelling of this sector is motivated by the observation that
in developing countries (as well as some ￿developed￿countries, such as Spain
or Southern Italy) agents who are not employed in either the ￿modern￿private
sector or by the SOEs ￿nd employment (or are considered o¢ cially unemployed)
in an informal sector, of which street-peddling and Mariachi bands are the most
picturesque examples.
Finally, the public sector may also employ labor, Lg, in SOEs to produce
the same consumption good (or a perfectly substitutable good) with the same
Ricardian technology that the informal sector uses.23The SOEs may pay a wage,
wg, higher than the marginal productivity of labor employed. If this is the case,
the losses, (wg￿￿)lg, (where lowercase letters denote per capita variables) of the
SOEs, are ￿nanced by the revenues of a proportional income tax, ￿, imposed on
22Since the formal sector is the only sector that employs capital (as will be seen below) K
also denotes the total capital stock of the economy.
23In reality, of course, the SOEs may have (and typically, many of them do have) access
to technologies potentially more capital-intensive than the ￿modern￿ private sector. Three
considerations motivate the modeling choice made in the paper. First, as argued in the Intro-
duction, we observe that SOEs normally employ ￿surplus labor￿that renders their technology
labor-intensive. Second, the actual pricing of the capital input in the SOEs is such that the
shadow rentals to be attributed to the capital they own is typically below market value. Fi-
nally, the technology modeled in the paper brings out very sharply the potentially super￿uous
nature of the SOEs from a strictly economic (as opposed to political) point of view.
7the factors employed by the formal sector.24 The government budget constraint
is, thus, given by:
(wg ￿ ￿)lg = ￿qp (2)
where the left hand-side of (2) denotes the outlays of the government and the
right-hand side its tax revenue.
Now, competition from workers in the informal sector ensures that the after-
tax wage rate across these private sectors is equalized.25Thus, given the propor-
tional tax rate, pro￿t maximization by ￿rms in the formal sector implies that the
rate of return on capital, r, and the level of employment in this sector depend
negatively on the tax rate:
lp = l(￿); l0(￿) < 0; (3)
r = r(￿); r0(￿) < 0: (4)
Intuitively, a higher tax rate lowers the employment level by reducing the after-
tax marginal productivity of labor in the formal sector. Decreased employment,
in turn, diminishes the marginal productivity of capital.26
2.1.1 Consumption
Turning to the consumption decisions of the households, note that they supply
labor and capital in competitive markets. Each household is assumed to supply
inelastically the unit of labor with which it is endowed. However, households
di⁄er with respect to their capital endowments ki ￿ 0 (i = 1;::;L).
Given the static nature of the model and the fact that there is, e⁄ectively,
one composite good to be consumed, the consumption decisions of households
are quite simple - each household, facing the parametric tax rate and factor
prices uses its wage and rental income (received in exchange for the services of
labor and capital supplied) to consume this composite good.
2.1.2 Political Economy
The environment within which we work is now endowed with su¢ cient structure
to answer the principal question we are interested in: Under what conditions will
this economy choose to operate a state-owned enterprise as described above?
To answer this question, however, we need to prescribe a rule which governs
the political decision process. The simplest and most frequently used rule in the
24The informal sector is in practice very di¢ cult to tax, thus any revenue that governments
actually raise by taxing this sector is small enough to be safely ignored in the present model.
25Though the formal sector (because of market imperfections) typically pays a wage above
that which can be earned in the informal sector, that wage is depressed by competition from
the pool of workers that ￿nd themselves in the latter sector. The result here should, therefore,
be interpreted as a version (at the margin) of the observed outcome.
26For explicit expressions for the derivatives in these and following equations see Appendix
II.
8literature is the majority rule provided that decisions are made in a democracy,
the agenda consists of a single item, and voters￿preferences are single peaked.
If this is the case, it is the preferences of the median voter we need to consult
to see if s/he would choose to operate the SOE under question. Even in the
absence of democracy, the median voter￿ s preference yields, at the very least,
some measure of the strength of support for the SOEs that the rulers will need
to pay attention to.
Now, since the consumer consumes all of his income in this static world, the
determination of the tax rate preferred by a household i can be formulated as
the solution to the maximization problem faced by this household of (expected)
indirect utility:
U = lgu[(l ￿ ￿)rki + wg] + (1 ￿ lg)u[(l ￿ ￿)rki + ￿] (5)
(where lg, the ratio of employment in the SOE to total employment, also de-
notes, from the household￿ s point of view, the probability of being employed
by the SOE and, thus receiving wg; the household will otherwise be employed
by the (formal or informal) private sector and earn the wage ￿) subject to the
government budget constraint (2) with:
(wg ￿ ￿)lg = ￿qp; ￿qp ￿ 0 (6)
The ￿rst-order conditions for the problem are:








u(cg) ￿ u(cp) = u0(cg)(wg ￿ ￿) (8)
￿￿qp = 0 (9)
where ￿ is the multiplier associated with the inequality constraint and ￿ denotes
the income share of capital in the formal sector.
Proposition 1 Agent i prefers no taxation (￿ = 0) and, thus, no state-owned
enterprises if and only if his capital endowment ki exceeds the average capital
endowment k.
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. The ￿rst step shows that ￿ = 0 and
implies ki > k. The second step shows the reverse implication.
1. Suppose ￿ = 0. This implies cg = cp = c, lg = 0, and ￿ > 0. The ￿rst
order condition then becomes u0(c)=[u0(c) + ￿] = k=ki. Since the lefthand-side
of this equation is less than 1, we have k < ki.
2. Suppose k < ki. We will show that if ￿ > 0 this would violate the
￿rst-order condition. If ￿ > 0 then ￿ = 0. Then the lefthand-side of the
equation in the ￿rst-order condition becomes [lgu0(cg)+(1￿lg)u0(cp)]=[u0(cg)]:
It is straightforward to show that this expression is greater than 1, because in
this case cg > cp and u00(￿) < 0. However, with k < ki and ￿ < 1 the expression
on the right-hand side of the ￿rst order condition is less than 1. Thus, the ￿rst
order condition is violated.
9Proposition 2 Ceteris paribus, agent i bene￿ts more from a higher tax and,
thus, a larger state-owned enterprise sector the smaller is his capital endowment
ki relative to the average capital endowment k.












The smaller ki is relative to the average capital endowment k, the more likely
it is for this inequality to hold. Note that for ki = 0 this inequality implies a
welfare-maximizing level of tax ~ ￿ such that ~ ￿ = ￿. This is the tax rate that
maximizes the tax revenue of the government allowing for the maximum size of
the state-owned enterprise sector.
This proposition can mainly be interpreted in two ways. First, one can focus
on a median agent and take the proposition to imply that the lower the median
agent￿ s capital endowment is relative to that of the average agent, the bigger
will be the size of the SOE sector.27 To see why, consider some tax rate. Will
the median agent have a higher utility if the tax rate is raised? Or, to put
it di⁄erently, would the median agent prefer a higher tax rate? The answer is
more likely to be in the a¢ rmative the smaller the median agent￿ s endowment is
relative to the endowment of the average agent. Intuitively speaking, this result
belongs to a class of results obtained in the political economy literature that
redistributive instruments will be preferred by a median voter whose wealth
(or income) lies below that of the average agent. It di⁄ers from the existing
literature in the form of the redistributive instrument (which is generally a lump-
sum transfer payment28). But our result can also be interpreted to imply simply
that (i) the majority of the population would prefer to have an SOE sector as
long as the the median agent￿ s capital endowment is smaller than that of the
average agent, and (ii) this majority would be a larger fraction of the population
the lower the median agent￿ s capital endowment is relative to that of the average
agent. Under such an interpretation we would leave the nexus between the
preferences of the majority and the ultimate political decision unspeci￿ed, and
point to the needs of autocrats and dictators for popular support to perpetuate
their rule. This need seems to have motivated rulers like Banzer of Bolivia
and Echeverria of Mexico to use the SOEs to redistribute income to obtain the
support required.
A second way to interpret the proposition is to note that capital-rich agents
would prefer to have lower taxes, less redistribution, and, thus, smaller SOE
sectors. In the partisan politics approach, pro-capital right-wing parties that
rely on the political and ￿nancial support of capital-rich agents would then opt
to reduce the size of the SOE sector. Similarly, pro-labor left-wing parties that
rely on the support of capital-poor agents would then choose to increase the
size of the SOE sector and redistribute more. The depth and duration of these
27The median agent is de￿ned here to mean the agent that owns the median capital stock.
28See, for example, Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Alesina and Rodrik (1992).
10policies would depend on exogenous changes in global economic conditions, or
on domestic social, political, economic realities, which might, and routinely do,
trigger realliances of political forces. The choices of a Banzer or an Echeverria
re￿ ect these changing conditions, which can also be thought of as changes in
the weights that a government attaches to the welfare of di⁄erent groups in the
Grossman and Helpman (1994) approach.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Econometric Speci￿cation
The theory outlined above predicts that the more unequal the distribution of
wealth, the more likely it is for a country to operate an SOE sector as a redis-
tributive tool. To test this prediction, we estimate cross-country regressions of
the following type:
SOEi = ￿1 + ￿2INEQi + ￿X + "i (11)
where SOE is an indicator of the relative size of the SOEs in overall economic
activity, INEQ denotes a measure of inequality, and X is a vector of control
variables.
To capture the underlying data generating process as much as possible, we
also consider several plausible scenarios related to the use of SOEs as a redis-
tributive tool. First, can governments redistribute inde￿nitely? That is, in
terms of our theoretical model, can the government keep levying taxes on the
capital-rich? This calls for modelling a possible non-linearity in the inequality-
redistribution relationship, which we do by employing a squared INEQ variable
in Equation (11). Second, the political ideology of the government may explain
the extent to which the inequality-redistribution relationship holds. Speci￿c-
ally, as their core clientele spans capital-poor labor, left-wing governments are,
ceteris paribus, expected to redistribute more in a society with higher inequality
in comparison to right-wing governments. The non-linearity argument may also
apply to this channel in that there may be a limit to which left-wing govern-
ments can be engaged in redistribution. Third, in relation to political regimes,
it is well-established that even dictators need popular support to maintain their
power (Alesina and Rodrik 1994). On the other hand, Rodrik (1999) ￿nds that
democracies pay higher wages. Thus, the di⁄erence between authoritarian and
democratic regimes in redistribution is an important question to explore.
The political ideology considerations suggest the following estimating equa-
tion:
SOEi = ￿1 + ￿2INEQi + ￿3INEQ2
i + ￿4WING + ￿5WING ￿ INEQ
+￿6WING ￿ INEQ2 + ￿X + ui (12)
where WING comprises indicators of the government￿ s political ideology, i.e.,
left-, center- or right-wing. The e⁄ect of democracy is tested through:
11SOEi = ￿1 + ￿2INEQi + ￿3INEQ2
i + ￿4DEMOC + ￿5DEMOC ￿ INEQ
+￿6DEMOC ￿ INEQ2 + ￿Z + vi (13)
where DEMOC is the measure of civil liberties.29 While Equation (11) will test
redistribution as a macro issue in the political-economic structure, the approach
adopted in Equations (12) and (13) will shed light on more speci￿c channels in
redistribution.
Several control variables are used to help identify the impact of the state
variables on SOE. Often these variables aim at controlling for cross-country
di⁄erences in the structural characteristics of an economy. First, we control for
whether the country is oil-producing, as oil may result in state monopolization
in the economy. We also control for small island countries, whose economies
may be dominated by ￿shery or tourism, with a smaller role for the state. In
addition, the level of state involvement in the economy would be in￿ uenced
by whether it is dominated by agricultural vis-￿-vis manufacturing sectors. To
control for this e⁄ect we use the share of urban population in total population.
Besides being highly correlated with the sectoral shares, this variable also helps
control the overall level of economic development. Further, we control for the
level of civil liberties (except in Equation (13)) because WING comprises left-,
center- and right-wing executives, with no distinction made between whether
they are democratic or authoritarian (military, etc) regimes. Finally, we con-
trol comprehensively for region-speci￿c e⁄ects that may in￿ uence the type of
economic activity.30 We conduct a number of robustness checks regarding the
composition of these variables in the speci￿cations.
3.2 Data
We employ two types of datasets: cross-sectional and panel. The former in-
cludes the 1978-1991 averages of the relevant data, and the latter spans the
time period 1970-2004 in the form of ￿ve-yearly time windows. For the depend-
ent variable, we have two SOE measures available in the cross-sectional dataset:
the share of the SOEs￿production in GDP and in non-agricultural GDP. The
data come from Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Gov-
ernment Ownership (1995), as averages of the period 1978-1991.31 The panel
data measure is the share of SOEs in total investment activity, obtained from
Fraser Institute￿ s Economic Freedom of the World database (Gwartney, Lawson,
29Z is X but civil liberties. As components of democracy, political rights and civil liberties
are highly correlated. Civil liberties is the preferred measure in our case as it comprises
freedom of speech and association.
30It must be noted that Schultz (1998), among others, found that regional e⁄ects explain
a portion of cross-country variation in inequality. Hence, we are careful with a possible
multicollinearity between regional dummies and INEQ.
31The source actually provides the data in a panel format, but many missing observations
prevent formation of a viable panel dataset. Therefore, we make use of the averages of the
available data for cross-sectional analysis.
12and Norton 2008). The latter is a very comprehensive database with a broad
country coverage, and is adopted widely around the world to analyze the impact
of institutions on economic performance.32 The data are available in ￿ve-yearly
time windows between 1970 and 1995 and annually after 2000.33 We also con-
vert this measure into cross-sectional form, enabling us to use three di⁄erent
variables for SOE in the cross-sectional analysis. The explanatory variables in
the analysis are utilized both in cross-sectional and panel forms accordingly.
A conceptual problem may exist with SOE investment: investment can be
based on purely economic and non-political reasons. The counter-argument is
that most political scientists would strongly suggest the presence of political
motives behind a signi￿cant portion of SOE investments and would argue that
investment is at least partially determined by redistributive concerns, political
ideology, and the type of political regime. We check the cross-sectional correl-
ation between the share of SOE production and SOE investment in GDP in
our sample. Bearing in mind that they come from di⁄erent data sources, the
correlation turns out to be 0.52, which is moderately high. So we proceed with
SOE investment.34
As per the measure of INEQ, we use income Gini coe¢ cient (denoted by
GINI). We expect a positive sign for GINI, that is, as the income distribution
becomes more unequal, we expect the share of SOEs in total GDP to increase.
The data have been obtained from UNU/WIDER (2005). We also considered
using share of median quintile in income distribution as a measure of (reverse)
inequality. The correlation between share of median quintile and income Gini is
found to be -0.95, where the results with income Gini are replicated exactly in
terms of the patterns in the ￿ndings. Thus, in the interest of saving space, we do
not pursue this variable. We also experiment with land Gini as the indicator of
the wealth inequality. The data are obtained from Deininger and Olinto (2000).
The political ideology data have been obtained from Database of Political
Institutions (Beck et al 2001). This database is annually updated and includes
data for the period 1975 through 2006, and provides qualitative information on
the political leaning of the executive power for each country, in the form of left-
ist, centrist and rightist ideologies. We utilize this information in several ways in
constructing the WING variable. First, we use the share of years in which each
ideology reigns in the country over the course of the relevant time period (i.e.,
the cross-sectional period of 1978-1991, and within each ￿ve-yearly interval for
panel data). This provides a continuous measure of political ideology. Second,
we adopt the discrete form of the measure by creating dummy variables (i.e.,
32See, among others, La Porta et al￿ s (1999) "The Quality of Government".
33We average the annual observations between 2000 and 2004 so as to form a ￿ve-yearly
panel comprising ￿ve-yearly periods 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000.
34Regarding the measure of SOE investment, the constant term of the regression can help
clarify its e⁄ects: in the context of Equation (11) any systematic non-model variation in the
dependent variable, such as rational investment would be captured by the constant term.
Thus, our state variables would capture the redistributive components in the dependent vari-
able over and above the systematic non-model variation that is captured by the constant term.
In fact, this logic applies to the cases of SOE production in GDP and non-agricultural GDP,
which are measures closer to our theoretical model.
13leftist, centrist and rightist dummies). When a regime is observed over more
than half of the relevant time period, the dummy takes the value 1, otherwise
it is zero. A few marginal cases are handled using the approach of Dutt and
Mitra (2005).35 An important issue here is the ￿unspeci￿ed￿category of the
political leanings. Beck et al. (2001) list some country-year observations as pos-
sessing ￿no information￿ . For instance, the Mahatir period of Malaysia, several
monarchs in the Middle East such as King Hassan of Morocco, King Hussein of
Jordan, Sheikh Zayed of UAE, several governments that ran Pakistan during the
1980￿ s and 2000￿ s, and some military regimes in Africa are listed with no speci￿c
information regarding their ideology. We manage the unspeci￿ed category in
several di⁄erent ways. First, we treat these rulers as ￿unspeci￿ed-wing￿ , i.e., a
fourth type of political leaning, and include them in the regressions to look at
their implications. Second, we incorporate them in the centrist category (as in
Dutt and Mitra 2005). Third, we remove them from the sample. Our results
are robust to di⁄erent ways of managing this category.36
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the cross-sectional data, their
sources, and some relevant explanations.
3.3 Estimation Methodology
We use Two-Stages Least Squares (2SLS) for the cross-sectional analysis and
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for the panel analysis. In both cases,
the underlying problem is the endogeneity of inequality. GINI may be endogen-
ous because the size of the SOE sector may a⁄ect income inequality. In other
words, countries with high income inequality may be associated with greater
redistribution that aims at reducing inequality. Thus, GINI is instrumented.
Our choice of instrumental variables (IVs) relies on Li, Squire and Zhou (1998),
who ￿nd that, in a cross-country context, civil liberties, M2/GDP (as a meas-
ure of ￿nancial deepening), initial average years of schooling and land Gini
(as an indicator of wealth inequality) can explain income inequality. Whether
these variables constitute viable IVs in our analysis is an issue. Speci￿cally,
for a valid instrumentation, IVs should be strong, exogenous, and excludable
from the SOE equation. We already use civil liberties as a control in the SOE
equation, therefore, it cannot form a distinct IV. Regarding M2/GDP, it is well-
known that SOEs run chronic losses, which may be monetized, leading to a rise
in the monetary base and, therefore in￿ uencing M2/GDP. Thus, this variable
cannot constitute an exogenous IV, and hence is ruled out. We believe that
average years schooling in 1965 and land Gini constitute valid IVs. First, they
35See Dutt and Mitra (2005, pp. 63-64). In our case, Argentina had six years of centrist
and six years of autocratic regimes, while in Uruguay seven years were autocratic and seven
years were rightist. These countries are assigned to the centrist regime. Our results are robust
to variations in such classi￿cations. We also followed the same route in the categorization in
the panel data and these results, too, are robust to variations in categorizations.
36We also considered an ordinal approach to political idelogy whereby leftist regimes could
take the value 0, centrist regimes 1 and the rightist regimes 2. In doing so, countries with
unspeci￿ed political leaning had to be removed from the sample. Our results are robust to
this approach as well.
14are not expected to be directly in￿ uenced by SOE, and therefore, to be exo-
genous. Second, regressing GINI on these variables delivers high F-statistics
(greater than 10), implying that they are strong instruments, as in Stock and
Yogo (2005). Third, we do not expect that schooling directly in￿ uences SOE,
thus it is excludable. One can argue that schooling may act like a measure
of development level, and hence may capture the level of capital depth in the
country, in￿ uencing the use of SOEs. However, we use urban population as a
control, which would address this issue.37 On the other hand, land Gini may
directly in￿ uence SOE through the suggested mechanism in this paper. To ex-
plore the direct relationship between land Gini and SOE, we run a number of
regressions under several plausible scenarios, but never ￿nd a signi￿cant direct
relationship.38
An additional issue with GINI is that UNU/WIDER reports GINI obser-
vations as being based on income vs consumption, net vs gross income, and
person vs household income constructions, as well as belonging to other in-
come types such as earnings and monetary income. In addition, UNU/WIDER
provides a quality indicator for the income distribution series (quality depends
on the original source of data). Knowing the source of the measurement and
quality di⁄erences helps address it; we use NET, PERSON, EARNINGS,
MONETARY and CONSUMPTION dummies39 and the QUALITY vari-
able as IVs.40 In total, our IVs for GINI include land Gini, average years
of schooling,41 and the dummies that control for construction di⁄erences and
quality in the inequality measure.42
This IV strategy resulted in the number of variables in our instruments mat-
rix being greater than the number of independent variables - thus, our equations
were over-identi￿ed. We then performed the suggested Sargan tests. In the case
of cross-sectional data we failed to reject the null hypothesis for every speci￿ca-
tion. Having valid instruments at our disposal, we next conducted Durbin-Wu-
Hausman tests to see whether the endogeneity of GINI is statistically supported
(Davidson and McKinnon 2004, p. 338). These tests showed that inequality is
endogenous to SOE for most of the speci￿cations across di⁄erent WING meas-
ures. To conclude, with all tests approving our instrumentation strategy, our
estimation methodology for cross-sectional analysis is 2SLS.
37All controls are included in the ￿rst-stage regressions, helping utilize the exogenous vari-
ation in the schooling variable.
38Note that land Gini would be exogenous to SOE size in our context, so directly using it
as a regressor instead of income Gini would not require instrumentation.
39Kuznets (1989) favors gross, household-based income to measure inequality.
40The QUALITY indicator takes values 1, 2, 3 and 4, with the lowest value representing
the highest quality in terms of the data source.
41We use schooling data from Barro and Lee (2001). We experiment with a range of school-
ing values, such as that of population above 15 and 25, and values belonging to 1960 and
1965. Intuitively we ￿nd the schooling values of 1965 and of population above 15 as the most
plausible to explain income inequality of 1978-1991, and hence they are used in the reported
results.
42Our controls oil, small island dummy and regional dummies are strictly exogenous to
SOE. We do not expect civil liberties and urban population to be endogenous to SOE, but
use their 1970-74 values as a safeguard.
15In panel data analysis, we ￿rst adopted the conventional cross-sectional time
series approach with a motivation to account for country-speci￿c ￿xed and/or
random e⁄ects. Using the same set of instruments de￿ned above, but utilizing
them in panel form, we ran pooled data regressions. It turns out that, in
these regressions, Sargan tests do not allow for over-identifying restrictions (as
speci￿ed in the cross-sectional context). A number of exercises43 show that
the problem originates from variables that control the construction di⁄erences
in GINI. This is not surprising because measurement error creates complex
problems in panel data (Woolridge 2002, pp. 311-314). We did not elect to play
with the IV matrix as it is essential to control for construction di⁄erences in
GINI. Thus, we did not pursue this panel approach - instead, we changed the
panel design and employed the data in the form of cross-sections pooled over
time, estimating equations relating to each time period in a system of equations
framework.44 We adopted GMM to estimate the system, and used the same
set of IVs as in the cross-sectional case. In doing so, we controlled for time-
speci￿c e⁄ects by allowing the intercepts vary, but imposed coe¢ cients to be the
same for right-hand side variables over time. The J-statistic obtained from the
GMM minimization criterion was used to construct Sargan test statistics, which
suggested accepting the over-identifying restrictions for the system (Woolridge
2002, p. 201).
4 Results
Table 2 presents the ￿rst stage results of GINI. Regressing GINI on all in-
struments ￿nds the majority of instruments were signi￿cant except monetary
income and earnings (Model 1). We removed the latter in two steps (Model
2 and Model 3), a procedure justi￿ed with the Wald test, and found that the
remaining instruments were highly signi￿cant.45 The model has an F-statistic
of 20, rejecting the presence of weak instruments. In this model, instruments
possess the expected signs: while higher land inequality and person-based in-
come Gini construction are associated with higher income Gini values, higher
average years of schooling in 1965, and net income- and consumption-based Gini
construction are associated with lower Gini values.46 In addition, higher qual-
ity Gini values are on average lower. In what follows, we use the explanatory
variables in Model 3 (Table 2) as instruments.
43These include Sargan tests for each combination of IVs.
44Pooled cross-sections is also the panel approach of Dutt and Mitra (2005). They use
instrumental variables as the estimation method.
45A Wald test shows that removed instruments are jointly insigni￿cant whereby the p-value
is 0.71.
46Person-based income Gini construction takes into account within-household income in-
equality, and hence is higher relative to household-based construction. Net income is obvi-
ously after-tax income and is more even relative to gross income. Likewise, consumption-based
Gini captures after-saving income distribution, which is more even relative to income-based
distribution.
164.1 Simple Relationship between SOE and Income Inequal-
ity
Tables 3a, 3b and 3c present the estimation results for Equation (11) and as such
depict the simple and direct relationship between SOEs￿roles in the economy
and income inequality. Using all the three dependent variables, SOEGDP,
NONAG, and SOEINV , and OLS estimation, Table 3a clearly shows that the
relationship is non-linear, rather than linear. Further indications of the non-
linear relationship are found Figures 1 and 2. The locally weighted regression
lines between GINI and SOEGDP and SOEINV , respectively, are estim-
ated to be non-linear. The estimation results with 2SLS are reinforcing (Table
3b). Although the linear relationship is weakly signi￿cant with SOEGDP and
NONAG, the non-linear relationship is statistically stronger across all the three
SOE measures. Table 3c presents the sensitivity of the 2SLS results to control
variables. The latter are added to the regressions in two steps. Model 1 in-
cludes oil exporter and small island dummies, civil liberties score and urban
population share in 1970. Model 2 includes, in addition, the regional dummies.
Model 3 eliminates the insigni￿cant controls through general-to-speci￿c model-
ling procedure a la Hendry (1995) in order to check the sensitivity of GINI and
GINI2. Evidence of the non-linearity varies in this case. Focusing on Models
3, 6 and 9, non-linearity prevails when NONAG is the dependent variable, is
weakly signi￿cant using SOEGDP, and loses signi￿cance when SOEINV is
the dependent variable. These results encouraged us to look for further factors
that play a role in the data generating process, and which we believe are related
to the political ideology of the government.
4.2 Political Ideology and Redistribution
Tables 4a and 4b present the estimation results for Equation (12), again using
the three SOE indicators. Table 4a presents the OLS results while Table 4b
presents the results with 2SLS. Our focus will be on the 2SLS results; Table 4a
is presented only to show that our results with 2SLS are robust across di⁄erent
estimation methods. Also, DWH tests, presented at the bottom of Table 4a,
show that it is prudent to address the endogeneity of GINI.47 The measure
for WING is the continuous measure, where ￿ unspeci￿ed￿wings are treated as
a separate group. For each dependent variable, three models are presented. In
the ￿rst, Equation (12) is estimated without controls; in the second, controls
are included, and in the third, insigni￿cant controls are removed to check the
sensitivity of the state variables. As before, the removal of the insigni￿cant
controls is justi￿ed with Wald tests.
47To save space, estimation results of Equation (11) with OLS using di⁄erent WING meas-
ures are not presented. In those regressions as well as in Table 4a, evidence for GINI￿ s
endogeneity is stronger when no controls are used. Including control variables, especially
regional dummies, is found to weaken the reverse causation in the case of SOEGDP and
NONAG as dependent variables. This is understandable because our mostly time-invariant
controls help capture several initial conditions. On the other hand, using SOEINV as the
SOE measure, evidence for endogeneity is always robust and consistent.
17We next proceed with 2SLS (Table 4b). The Hansen￿ s J-statistics presented
justify our instrumentation procedure. While we touch upon all models for
discussion, our focus will be on Models 3, 6 and 9. In all these models, there is
overall a very consistent pattern in the estimated coe¢ cients, with signi￿cance
levels varying mostly within conventional levels. First, there is a strong non-
linearity regarding the impact of GINI on SOE. In addition, non-linearity is also
observed in regard to government￿ s political ideology in that there is a limit to
which political ideology is associated with higher redistribution through SOEs.
Speci￿cally, compared to right-wing governments, left-wing, center-wing and
unspeci￿ed-wing governments redistribute more through SOEs, but this e⁄ect
tapers o⁄ at higher levels of inequality.
In Model 3 (Table 4b), all state variables are strongly signi￿cant at 1% and
5% levels. To represent the regression output, consider the following estimated
equation:
SOEGDP = 98:68 ￿ 5:03GINI + 0:06GINI2 ￿ 154LEFT ￿ 285:21CENTER
￿162:94UNSPEC + 7:79LEFT ￿ GINI + 13:91CENTER ￿ GINI
+8:34UNSPEC ￿ GINI ￿ 0:09LEFT ￿ GINI2
￿0:16CENTER ￿ GINI2 ￿ 0:10UNSPEC ￿ GINI2 + :::: + ui
The impact of GINI on SOEGDP is shown as follows:
@SOEGDP
@GINI
= ￿5:03 + 0:12GINI + 7:79LEFT + 13:91CENTER
+8:34UNSPEC ￿ 0:18LEFT ￿ GINI
￿0:32CENTER ￿ GINI ￿ 0:20UNSPEC ￿ GINI
This derivative implies that redistribution through SOEs depends on the
political ideology of the government and the level of inequality. Take, for in-
stance, the minimum Gini value in the sample, 24.5.48 If there is a left-wing
government in the full 1978-91 period, then ￿5:03 + 0:12 ￿ 24:5 + 7:79 ￿ 1 ￿
0:18 ￿ 1 ￿ 24:45, which means that a one unit increase in Gini increases the
SOE share in GDP by 1.3%. When the government ideology is the ￿ unspeci￿ed￿
type, the same amounts of increase are observed.49 These e⁄ects taper o⁄ and
reach a turning point around the mean Gini value, 45, around which Gini has
no impact on the SOE share. After this point, higher Gini values start having a
negative impact on SOEGDP, possibly because redistribution becomes costly
to the society. For instance, around the Gini value 55, and with the full sample
period governed by a left- or unspeci￿ed-wing government, an increase in Gini
by one unit decreases SOEGDP by 0.5%.
48We disregard the type of Gini construction for the moment.
49When the government possessed a center-wing ideology, a one unit increase in GINI
increases SOEGDP by almost 4.95%, but the mean share of center-wing goverments in the
sample is low, i.e., around 5%, so such ￿ wild￿variations are possible.




= ￿154 + 7:79GINI ￿ 0:09GINI2
This derivative suggests that between the income Gini levels 27.25 and 61.25,
left-wing governments are always associated with a higher SOE share in GDP.
The zeal of this e⁄ect is around the mean Gini value of 45. Note that these are
￿corrected" Gini levels, i.e., corrected during the instrumentation procedure,
and thus refer to household gross income-based constructions. In our sample,
there are two countries with income Gini values lower than 27.25 (Belgium and
Denmark), but these values are net income-based constructions; accounting for
the ￿understatement￿of inequality would push these countries into the estim-
ated band 27.25-61.25, implying a positive impact of left-wing governments on
SOEGDP. Likewise, in our sample there are three income Gini values higher
than 61.25 (Sierra Leone, Central African Republic and Senegal). These are
person-based income Gini constructions with a quality rating 3; correcting the
￿overstatement￿of inequality would put these countries into the estimated band.
This implies that potentially in all countries in our sample, left-wing govern-
ments are associated with a higher SOE share in GDP.
In terms of control variables, oil exporter countries and lower levels of civil
liberties are associated with higher shares of SOE in GDP. Comparing Models
1, 2 and 3, it is clear that control variables help identify the impact of GINI
and GINI2 as seen through stronger signi￿cance levels, while the e⁄ects related
to political ideolgies are robust with and without controls.
Model 6 (Table 4b) shows that using NONAG as the dependent variable,
the results in Model 3 are almost completely replicated, with slightly lower
signi￿cance levels overall, though at conventional levels. One exception is that
the center-wing government e⁄ect is not signi￿cant. With key point estimates,
for example, of GINI and GINI2 being signi￿cant around 10%, we do not
attempt to derive numerical inference; however, the e⁄ects related to left-wing
and unspeci￿ed-wing ideologies are found to be robustly signi￿cant at the 5%
level. The same control variables as before, i.e., oil exporters and civil liberties,
are found to have robust and signi￿cant controlling e⁄ects.
Model 9 (Table 4b) shows that using SOEINV as the dependent variable
also results in the same pattern of signs. However, GINI, GINI2 and the e⁄ects
related to political ideology become weaker in signi￿cance. Our further explor-
ation (unreported) shows that this is due to the Sub-Saharan African dummy,
which, if remains in the model during the general-to-speci￿c modelling proced-
ure, tends to wash out the explanatory power of income inequality and related
interaction variables. However, this dummy is generally insigni￿cant itself in af-
fecting the SOE size, and, in most of the cases, is removed from the regression.50
In terms of control variables, oil exporter countries are associated with higher
SOE investment, but the magnitude of the coe¢ cient is much smaller compared
50We note again the Schultz (1998) ￿nding that regional e⁄ects and inequality are correlated.
19to SOE production. Additionally, small island economies are involved with less
SOE investment, as are countries with higher levels of democracy.
Table 5 shows the results whereby WING is represented by a discrete meas-
ure. With this measure, the results found in Table 4 are all replicated in terms
of the sign structure of the state variables. Considering Models 3, 6 and 9,
the overall conclusion is that the impact of GINI on SOE works through the
political ideology channel. Speci￿cally, left-wing and center-wing governments
and their interactions with GINI possess robustly signi￿cant coe¢ cients. The
￿unspeci￿ed-wing￿e⁄ect is signi￿cant only when SOE production is used as a
dependent variable, otherwise it has a t-statistic between 1.18 and 1.62. With
these results, we are relatively con￿dent that the political ideology e⁄ects are
not driven by the WING measure. The insigni￿cance of GINI and GINI2
may be due to the fact that the discrete WING measure (which is a more ag-
gregate measure relative to continuous) takes away their explanatory power by
encapsulating their e⁄ects.
Table 6 presents the results whereby the ￿unspeci￿ed￿ -wing governments are
considered as center-wing. With this exercise too, we obtain similar results as
above in terms of the signs of the coe¢ cients. The redistribution e⁄ects related
to left-wing and center-wing governments are strongly signi￿cant across all SOE
measures. Considering that SOEINV and other dependent variables come
from entirely di⁄erent data sources, the robust redistribution e⁄ect of left-wing
governments is noteworthy. In an unreported regression, we remove unspecifed-
wing governments from the dataset. Having around 40 observations in the
model, the statistical signi￿cance of variables is naturally reduced. However,
the left-wing government e⁄ect is signi￿cant around the 12%-15% levels.
Table 7 presents the panel data results. Noting that we use only SOEINV
as the dependent variable, the overall evidence found through cross-sectional
analysis is generally replicated. Speci￿cally, the redistributive engagement of
left-wing governments and that this engagement is non-linear along income Gini
values are robustly shown by the panel data. Likewise, the same e⁄ect is shown
robustly for governments of the unspeci￿ed wing as well. On the other hand, the
evidence varies for center-wing governments. First, a reverse sign structure - U
shape - is obtained for their redistributive engagement when a continuous WING
measure is used. However, this e⁄ect is not robust to the use of a discrete WING
measure, or to the treatment of an unspeci￿ed-wing as center-wing. While the
e⁄ect is insigni￿cant with the discrete measure, the sign structure becomes an
inverted-U shape with the latter treatment. This is possibly because the center-
wing e⁄ect is dominated by the unspeci￿ed-wing. Similarly, the stand-alone level
e⁄ect of GINI and GINI2 varies across the use of controls and the treatment of
unspeci￿ed-wing as center-wing. The inverted-U structure obtained in the cross-
sectional analysis is found only when control variables are used in the models
and the WING measures are continuous and discrete. It must be noted that
our panel data set brings together a collection of cross-sectional data sets with
short time windows (i.e., each covering ￿ve-yearly time periods), and therefore,
the relationships found may di⁄er when compared to a cross-sectional data set
that captures a longer time span (such as 1978-1991 above). In this respect, the
20redistributive involvement of left-wing governments and the fact that this e⁄ect
is non-linear emerges as robust evidence in our cross-sectional and panel data
analyses.
4.3 Further Links
Democracy vs Dictatorship. In the introduction we have argued that policy-
makers tend to be responsive to the concerns of the majority of the population
whether they are democratically elected or not. One could however plausibly
counter that there certainly might be a signi￿cant di⁄erence in degree if not
in kind between dictatorial and democratic policymakers. To investigate this
claim in the context of the SOE sector as a means of redistribution, we estimate
Equation (13), with GINI again instrumented. In doing so, we also relate our
results to Acemoglu and Johnson (2000), who argue a non-monotonic relation-
ship between inequality and democracy. In their context, democracy is essen-
tially a tool for redistribution, whereby initially higher inequality is associated
with ￿more￿ democracy (redistribution), but then higher levels of inequality
lead to less democracy (redistribution). Ignoring this point, we ￿rst use the
average democracy score as the measure of DEMOC in the regression. The
results, reported in Table 8a, possess no statistical signi￿cance across di⁄erent
SOE measures. If inequality causes democracy in the Acemoglu-Johnson sense,
then the insigni￿cance of DEMOC is understandable. Next, we address this
point by using initial levels of democracy. The results, reported in Table 8b,
are dramatically di⁄erent, at least for SOEGDP and NONAG. Both stand-
alone e⁄ects of inequality as seen through GINI and GINI2 and the e⁄ects
that depend on the level of democracy are signi￿cant in conventional limits.
As DEMOC is a reverse measure of democracy, a positive coe¢ cient points to
autocratic regimes redistributing more through SOEs, with however the e⁄ect
decreasing over higher levels of inequality. This enables us to arrive at a general
conclusion in lieu of Acemoglu and Robinson: whether measured by democracy
or the SOE share in production, higher inequality is associated with higher re-
distribution, and this e⁄ect is non-linear. Our results additionally suggest that
(as far as redistribution through the SOE sector is concerned) dictatorships are
as responsive to majoritarian concerns as democracies: a conclusion in conform-
ity with the anecdotal/historical evidence a limited selection of which we cited
in our introduction.51
SOEs and Employment Protection. Pagano and Volpin (2005) analyze the
political determinants of investor and employment protection. They ￿nd that
proportional (vs majoritarian) electoral systems, the political ideology of the
government, and the origin of the legal system explain cross-country di⁄erences
in employment protection. Further, once the electoral systems and legal origins
are controlled for, the political ideology of the government ceases to have ex-
51Alesina and Rodrik (1994) also conclude that ￿ ... even in a dictatorship, distributional
issues a⁄ecting the majority of the population will in￿uence policy outcomes.￿Dutt and Mitra
(2002) reach a similar conclusion in their empirical investigation of the political economy of
trade policy.
21planatory power (see also Botero et al. 2004 for regulation of labor). As SOEs
have long been argued to be instruments for the creation of secure employment,
we include the Pagano-Volpin variables to our models to check for this e⁄ect.
As shown in Table 9, addition of these variables to our models does not change
our main results relating to left-wing and unspeci￿ed-wing governments. The
center-wing government e⁄ect becomes insigni￿cant only when SOEGDP and
NONAG are used.52
5 Conclusion
The paper formalizes a popular, but informal, argument to explain the persist-
ence of the SOE sector in many less-developed countries (as well as in trans-
itional countries like Russia). In its broadest outline, the argument is that the
SOE sector is used as a redistributive device and cannot be easily given up
especially given the pains of other reforms that form a package of structural
adjustment. It is shown that capital-poor agents prefer to establish or main-
tain an SOE sector that redistributes income by paying higher wages than the
private sector and carrying surplus labor. The paper then ￿nds strong and
robust empirical support for this hypothesis. Speci￿cally, we test the two ques-
tions that generally come up in the political economy literature: (i) whether
and to what extent the political ideology of government a⁄ects redistribution,
and (ii) whether democracies are more likely to be responsive to popular pres-
sures when it comes to redistribution. First, we do ￿nd strong evidence that
non-right-wing governments are more prone to use the SOE sector as a redis-
tributive device. This e⁄ect is particularly robust for left-wing governments as
the result holds regardless of the dataset used (cross-sectional vs panel), di⁄er-
ent measures regarding political ideology and the role of SOEs in the economy,
and several speci￿cations of the econometric model. Further, this e⁄ect is found
to be non-linear, pointing out that there is a limit to which governments can
be engaged with redistributive activity. Second, we ￿nd that autocracies would
be more likely to redistribute through SOEs than democracies, and this e⁄ect,
too, is non-linear.
The next natural question, given the result obtained, is how to explain suc-
cessful privatization experiments such as Argentina￿ s. To answer the question
one can point out that factors that are not taken into account in the present
model drive the process of privatization. For example, Waterbury (1992) ar-
gues that this process is driven by ￿scal crises of varying intensity coupled with
in￿ ation, reduced international credit-worthiness, and impediments to export
promotion. Since, to keep the model as analytically simple as possible, we have
abstracted from such considerations, the model will not help us explore these
52Our results also show that the British legal system and in one case the German legal
system are associated with higher SOE shares in the economy. This seems to contradict
Pagano and Volpin (2005) (who use the OECD data), as they ￿nd that these legal systems
are associated with lower employment protection. However, di⁄erent country compositions in
the datasets can explain the di⁄ering ￿ndings.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Cross-Sectional Data, Data Sources and Explanations 
Variable   Mean  Median  Max  Min  St. Dev.  N  Data Source and Explanations 
SOE share in GDP (%)  11.91  9.50  64.60  1.20  10.99  75 
World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business. Averages of 
1978-1991. 
SOE share in non-agr. GDP (%)  14.96  11.15  71.70  1.30  13.70  74 
World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business. Averages of 
1978-1991. 
SOE share in total investment (%)  8.48  7.67  23.29  3.02  3.53  66 
Gwartney, Lawson, Sobel and Leeson (2007). 
Panel data converted into cross-sections by 
averaging 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995 obs. 
Income Gini   45.11  45.84  68.80  24.48  10.16  68  UNU/WIDER (2005). 0-100 scale. 
Person-based Gini Dummy  0.72  1  1  0  0.42  68  UNU/WIDER (2005) 
Net income-based Gini Dummy  0.33  0  1  0  0.46  68  UNU/WIDER (2005) 
Cons./Exp.-based Gini Dummy  0.31  0  1  0  0.45  68  UNU/WIDER (2005) 
Earnings-based Gini Dummy  0.04  0  1  0  0.18  68  UNU/WIDER (2005) 
Monetary Income-based Gini Dummy    0.16  0  1  0  0.36  68  UNU/WIDER (2005) 
Quality of Gini (1 to 4)   2.32  2.50  4  1  0.82  68  UNU/WIDER (2005) 
Land Gini  65.23  67.59  92  35.25  16.18  72  Deininger and Olinto (2000). 0-100 scale. 
Unspecified Wing   0.39  0.21  1  0  0.43  74  Beck et al. (2008). Continuous measure statistics. 
Left Wing   0.30  0  1  0  0.39  74  Beck et al. (2008). Continuous measure statistics. 
Center Wing   0.05  0  1  0  0.18  74  Beck et al. (2008).  Continuous measure statistics. 
Right Wing              Beck et al. (2008).  Continuous measure statistics. 
Avg. Years of Schooling  3.28  2.99  9.09  0.17  2.22  61  Barro and Lee (2001) 
Oil Producing Dummy  0.07  0  1  0  0.25  75  World Bank, GDN Database 
Civil Liberties   4.09  4.33  7  1  1.73  73  www.freedomhouse.org  
Small Island Dummy  0.09  0  1  0  0.29  75 
CIA World Factbook. Island countries whose 
surface areas are less than 10,000 sqkm. 
East Asia and Pacific  Dummy  0.07  0  1  0  0.25  75  World Bank, GDN Database 
South Asia  Dummy  0.07  0  1  0  0.25  75  World Bank, GDN Database 
Sub-Saharan Africa  Dummy  0.36  0  1  0  0.48  75  World Bank, GDN Database 
Latin America and the Carib. Dummy    0.29  0  1  0  0.46  75  World Bank, GDN Database 












Absolute value of the robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. Wald test: p-values of the F-statistic for joint insignificance of the eliminated control variables, with the null 
hypothesis being they are jointly insignificant. F-statistic for overall model significance. 
 
Table 3a. Simple Relationship between SOE and Income Gini - OLS 
  Dep. Var: SOEGDP  Dep. Var: NONAG  Dep. Var: SOEINV 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
GINI 0.036  1.496**  0.066  2.068**  0.006  0.700*** 
 (0.34)  (2.14)  (0.50)  (2.03)  (0.16)  (2.87) 
GINI
2   -0.0162**    -0.0222*    -0.008*** 
   (-2.04)    (-1.92)    (-2.94) 
Constant 10.19*  -21.07  11.76*  -31.03  8.162***  -6.674 
 (1.93)  (-1.48)  (1.84)  (-1.50)  (5.40)  (-1.30) 
Observations 68  68  67  67  62  62 
R-squared 0.00  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.07 







Table 2. First Stage Regression of Income Inequality 
  Dependent Variable: Income Gini 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Net income based construction -9.281 -9.164 -8.825 
  (3.15)*** (3.37)*** (3.44)*** 
Monetary income based const. 3.012 2.949  
  (0.83) (0.83)  
Personal income based const.  5.925 6.012 6.698 
  (2.00)* (2.08)** (2.25)** 
Quality of GINI  2.338 2.398 2.608 
  (1.47) (1.57) (1.69)* 
Cons/Exp. based construction  -9.741 -9.818 -10.387 
  (2.45)** (2.52)** (2.58)** 
Earnings based construction  0.943  
  (0.13)  
Avg. School 1965  -1.772 -1.770 -1.503 
  (2.67)** (2.69)*** (2.54)** 
Land Gini  0.256 0.256 0.227 
  (3.13)*** (3.13)*** (2.87)*** 
Constant 29.574 29.380 30.064 
  (4.63)*** (4.53)*** (4.80)*** 
Observations 59 59 59 
R-squared 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Wald test 0.90 0.71 
F-statistic 13.60 15.61 19.99   30
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Table 3b. Simple Relationship between SOE and Income Gini – 2SLS 
  Dep. Var: SOEGDP  Dep. Var: NONAG  Dep. Var: SOEINV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
GINI  0.231* 2.196** 0.293* 3.195** 0.0532  1.010*** 
  (1.67) (2.13) (1.81) (2.37) (1.27)  (2.87) 
GINI
2   -0.022*    -0.033**    -0.011*** 
   (-1.94)  (-2.18)   (-2.77) 
Constant 0.986  -40.02*  0.946  -58.91**  5.591***  -14.67* 
  (0.18) (-1.86) (0.14) (-2.13) (3.07)  (-1.90) 
Observations  59 59 58 58 55  55 
Hansen's  J  0.28 0.32 0.07 0.10 0.18  0.40 
Absolute value of the robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. Hansen’s J: p-value for the heteroskedasticity-consistent Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, with the 
null hypothesis being the restrictions are valid. 
Table 3c. SOE and Income Gini – 2SLS and Controls
  Dep. Var: SOEGDP  Dep. Var: NONAG  Dep. Var: SOEINV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
GINI  1.259 2.000  2.212* 1.520 3.038 2.787**  0.843***  0.525  0.343 
  (1.10) (1.40) (1.90) (1.04) (1.55)  (2.33)  (2.65)  (1.05)  (0.95) 
GINI
2  -0.014 -0.019 -0.020 -0.018 -0.031 -0.030**  -0.009***  -0.004  -0.003 
  (-1.11) (-1.37) (-1.57) (-1.10) (-1.62) (-2.17)  (-2.68)  (-0.83)  (-0.66) 
Oil Exporter  23.21*  22.17** 21.33** 22.36* 21.70**   3.583**  4.501***  4.177***
  (1.96) (2.28) (2.13) (1.83) (2.04)    (2.35)  (4.23)  (5.42) 
Small Island  -7.301  -6.408    -9.415 -9.265    -2.209*  -0.819   
  (-1.03) (-0.88)    (-1.17) (-1.05)   (-1.87)  (-0.80)   
Civil Liberties 1970  1.022  0.0978    1.450  0.458    -0.218  -0.464*   
  (0.94) (0.10)    (1.05) (0.36)    (-0.73)  (-1.82)   
Urban Pop. 970  -0.0315  0.003    -0.105  -0.047    -0.0340**  0.00228   
 (-0.51)  (0.027)    (-1.28)  (-0.33)   (-1.99)  (0.086)   
East Asia and Pac.    -1.849      -4.449      1.481   
   (-0.29)    (-0.56)     (0.73)   
South  Asia   -0.930    -1.957      3.378**  2.398***
   (-0.16)    (-0.24)     (2.15)  (2.71) 
Sub-Saharan  Afr.   1.345    2.987  9.017*    0.397   
   (0.20)    (0.37)  (1.75)    (0.18)   
Lat. Amer. and Car.    -4.743  -6.833*  -5.483      -2.213  -2.037**
   (-0.53)  (-1.88)  (-0.49)     (-0.83) (-2.13) 
M. East and N. Afr.    10.55  11.07*    8.915  17.06*    3.675  2.802** 
   (1.34)  (1.82)  (0.96)  (1.71)    (1.63) (2.05) 
Constant  -19.03 -37.85  -44.60* -18.35 -54.98 -50.43**  -8.626  -5.384  -1.678 
  (-0.76) (-1.09) (-1.84) (-0.59) (-1.13) (-2.12)  (-1.14)  (-0.46)  (-0.23) 
Observations  59 59 59 58 58  58  55  55  55 
Hansen's  J  0.24 0.29 0.42 0.09 0.19  0.25  0.45  0.16  0.13 
Wald  test     0.98     0.45     0.42 
Absolute value of the robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. Hansen’s J: p-value for the heteroskedasticity-consistent Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, with the 
null hypothesis being the restrictions are valid. Wald test: p-values of the F-statistic for joint insignificance of the 
eliminated control variables, with the null hypothesis being they are jointly insignificant.  32
 
Absolute value of the robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Wald test: p-
values of the F-statistic for joint insignificance of the eliminated control variables, with the null hypothesis referring to joint 
insignificance. DWH test: p-values of the Chi-squared test statistic of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, with null hypothesis of no 
endogeneity. Specifically, the test is carried out by regressing GINI on instruments, saving the residuals next, and then inserting them 
back to the OLS regression in appropriate form (i.e., in levels as well as by interacting  them with variables interacted with GINI itself 
where necessary), and finally, testing the joint significance of all residual variables and their interactions.
Table 4a. SOE, Political Ideology, Income Inequality – OLS Estimations - Continuous Wing Measure 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Dependent Var: SOEGDP  Dependent Var: NONAG  Dependent Var: SOEINV 
Constant  30.964  69.822  -3.656  27.025  67.437  49.383 11.019 20.762  9.040 
 (1.13)  (1.61)  (1.85)*  (0.82)  (1.21)  (1.18)  (0.96)  (1.96)*  (0.78) 
GINI -1.512  -3.571  0.045  -1.370  -3.278  -2.550 -0.363 -0.757 -0.283 
 (1.03)  (1.65)  (1.92)*  (0.77)  (1.18)  (1.12)  (0.60)  (1.45)  (0.46) 
GINI
2  0.019  0.043  -86.494  0.018  0.039  0.032 0.005 0.010 0.005 
  (1.11)  (1.66) (1.44) (0.87)  (1.18) (1.19)  (0.77)  (1.66)  (0.76) 
Left  Wing  -47.512  -83.997  -234.539  -45.306  -74.412  -67.938 -26.321 -34.584 -34.266 
 (0.81)  (1.28)  (2.88)***  (0.63)  (0.88)  (0.93)  (1.15)  (1.44)  (1.51) 
Center Wing  -295.283  -335.105  -126.461  -176.071  -52.402  -208.531  -159.800  -89.991  -112.562 
 (2.26)**  (2.21)**  (2.52)**  (0.31)  (0.06)  (0.37)  (3.95)***  (1.57)  (2.98)*** 
Unspecified Wing  -83.379  -128.263  4.842  -89.340  -136.548  -104.398  -4.710  -16.580  -2.482 
 (1.67)  (2.25)**  (1.66)  (1.40)  (1.77)*  (1.47)  (0.22)  (0.64)  (0.11) 
Left Wing  x GINI   3.101  4.755  11.572  3.085  4.312  4.107  1.594  1.931  1.911 
 (1.15)  (1.48)  (3.00)***  (0.92)  (1.03)  (1.15)  (1.44)  (1.75)*  (1.76)* 
Center Wing  x GINI  13.941  16.109  6.801  8.043  2.249  9.795  7.750  4.493  5.453 
 (2.34)**  (2.27)**  (2.73)***  (0.29)  (0.05)  (0.36)  (3.90)***  (1.64)  (2.92)*** 
Unspec. Wing  x  4.674  6.732  -0.055  5.326  7.292  6.223  0.516  0.939  0.422 
 (2.02)**  (2.46)**  (1.72)*  (1.80)*  (2.01)*  (1.86)*  (0.50)  (0.80)  (0.39) 
Left Wing  x GINI
2   -0.037  -0.055  -0.135  -0.036  -0.049  -0.047 -0.019 -0.023 -0.023 
 (1.25)  (1.54)  (3.03)***  (0.97)  (1.05)  (1.18)  (1.62)  (2.01)*  (1.95)* 
Center Wing  x GINI
2 -0.159  -0.184  -0.081  -0.090  -0.023  -0.111 -0.090 -0.053 -0.063 
 (2.41)**  (2.29)**  (2.83)***  (0.28)  (0.04)  (0.35)  (3.72)***  (1.64)  (2.78)*** 
Unspec. Wing xGINI
2 -0.056  -0.080  14.589  -0.065  -0.087  -0.077 -0.007 -0.012 -0.007 
  (2.19)**  (2.56)** (2.02)** (1.99)* (2.13)** (2.05)**  (0.64)  (0.95)  (0.60) 
Oil Exporter    15.596      14.749  13.700    2.794  3.105 
   (2.24)**      (1.91)*  (1.74)*    (2.90)***  (3.92)*** 
Civil  Liberties  1970    1.244     1.502     0.103   
    (1.15)     (1.05)     (0.18)   
Small  island    -3.945     -6.061     -1.786   
    (0.57)     (0.75)     (1.06)   
Urban  Pop.  1970    -0.031     -0.077     -0.032   
    (0.36)     (0.69)     (1.13)   
East Asia and Pac.    -0.951  14.756    -3.079      1.564   
   (0.15)  (3.13)***    (0.35)      (0.62)   
M. East and N. Afr.    10.842      11.090  15.574    2.624   
   (1.92)*      (1.36)  (2.89)***    (1.07)   
South  Asia    -5.018     -6.798     0.402   
    (0.89)     (0.86)     (0.19)   
Sub-Saharan  Afr.    -3.375     -2.880     1.126   
    (0.52)     (0.30)     (0.47)   
Latin Amer. and Car.    -1.136      -0.606      -0.742  -3.113 
    (0.25)     (0.08)     (0.37)  (2.74)*** 
Observations  68  68 68 67  67 67  62  62  62 
Wald  test     0.88    0.15      0.10 
DWH  test  0.15  0.90 0.19 0.00  0.88 0.46  0.00  0.00  0.00   33
Absolute value of the robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. Hansen’s J: p-value for the heteroskedasticity-consistent Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, with the 
null hypothesis being the restrictions are valid. Wald test: p-values of the F-statistic for joint insignificance of the 
eliminated control variables, with the null hypothesis of joint insignificance.
Table 4b. SOE, Political Ideology, Income Inequality – Cross-Sectional Data - 2SLS Estimations - Continuous Wing Measure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Dependent Var: SOEGDP  Dependent Var: NONAG  Dependent Var: SOEINV 
Constant  65.526 97.157 98.675 70.753 98.288  103.396  13.708 26.254 14.188 
  (1.70)* (2.16)*  (2.53)** (1.52)  (1.70)*  (2.28)** (1.30) (2.35)** (1.18) 
GINI  -3.192 -4.698 -5.025 -3.520 -4.566 -5.314 -0.478 -0.962 -0.523 
  (1.64) (2.15)**  (2.53)** (1.48)  (1.61) (2.25)** (0.86)  (1.74)*  (0.82) 
GINI
2  0.038 0.054 0.059 0.042 0.052 0.064 0.007 0.012 0.008 
  (1.71)*  (2.17)**  (2.61)** (1.55)  (1.61) (2.32)** (1.01)  (1.84)*  (1.04) 
Left  Wing  -137.915 -141.561 -154.000 -163.931 -166.202 -182.469  -27.489  -24.498  -21.778 
  (2.10)**  (2.65)***  (2.69)***  (2.22)**  (2.56)**  (2.91)***  (1.54) (1.41) (1.25) 
Center  Wing  -299.604 -250.332 -285.212 -397.200 -444.079  22.901  -155.207  -48.763  -54.845 
  (3.31)*** (2.22)*** (3.65)***  (0.84)  (0.60)  (0.05)  (4.60)***  (0.95)  (1.20) 
Unspecified  Wing  -121.640 -169.215 -162.943 -137.175 -194.519 -176.794  -4.493  -4.974  2.994 
  (1.97)**  (2.56)**  (2.72)***  (1.76)*  (2.18)**  (2.31)**  (0.25) (0.22) (0.12) 
Left  Wing    x  GINI    7.084 7.576 7.789 8.504 8.773 9.634 1.596 1.461 1.333 
  (2.23)** (2.90)***  (2.67)*** (2.36)** (2.72)***  (3.15)*** (1.85)*  (1.79)*  (1.60) 
Center Wing  x GINI  14.287  12.196  13.905  18.864  21.275  -1.167  7.548  2.714  2.909 
 (3.41)***  (2.32)**  (3.80)***  (0.82)  (0.60)  (0.05)  (4.51)***  (1.10)  (1.31) 
Unspec.  Wing  xGINI  6.163 8.216 8.384 7.290 9.492 9.424 0.408 0.331 0.029 
  (2.07)**  (2.64)***  (2.85)***  (1.93)*  (2.29)**  (2.51)**  (0.45) (0.32) (0.02) 
Left Wing  x GINI
2   -0.076 -0.086 -0.092 -0.092 -0.099 -0.107 -0.019 -0.018 -0.017 
  (2.21)** (2.99)***  (3.05)*** (2.33)** (2.76)***  (3.19)*** (2.01)** (2.06)**  (1.84)* 
Center Wing x GINI
2  -0.163 -0.140 -0.159 -0.215 -0.242 0.016 -0.088 -0.034 -0.036 
 (3.47)***  (2.34)**  (3.81)***  (0.81)  (0.60)  (0.06)  (4.27)***  (1.19)  (1.37) 
Unspec. WingxGINI
2  -0.070 -0.092 -0.096 -0.084 -0.108 -0.109 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 
  (2.11)**  (2.71)**  (2.89)***  (2.00)**  (2.37)**  (2.58)***  (0.54) (0.42) (0.14) 
Oil  Exporter   18.685  17.351  18.196  15.923  3.199  3.758 
   (3.07)***  (2.50)**   (2.76)***  (2.10)**   (4.97)***  (4.89)*** 
Civil  Liberties  1970  0.587    1.132    -0.507  -0.415 
   (0.61)    (0.84)     (1.93)*  (1.83)* 
Small  island   -9.225    -11.889     -3.072  -2.158 
   (1.24)    (1.37)     (2.28)**  (1.77)* 
Urban  Pop.  1970   -0.061    -0.117    -0.036  
   (0.74)    (1.09)    (1.49)  
East  Asia  and  Pac.   4.718    1.243    4.829  4.093 
   (0.79)    (0.14)     (3.16)***  (3.35)*** 
M. East and N. Afr.    12.524  12.935    9.439  13.157    5.200  4.222 
   (2.23)**  (3.13)***    (1.13)  (2.94)***    (3.87)***  (4.19)*** 
South Asia    -0.170      -2.485      2.614  3.014 
   (0.03)    (0.34)    (1.31)  (2.15)** 
Sub-Saharan Afr.    -4.925      4.538      3.730  2.923 
   (0.90)    (0.55)     (2.24)**  (2.12)** 
Latin Amer. and Car.    -3.265      1.470      1.941   
   (0.67)    (0.19)    (1.57)  
Observations  59 59 59 58 58 58 55 55 55 
Hansen's  J  0.77 0.36 0.63 0.67 0.39 0.62 0.14 0.52 0.10 
Wald’s  test     0.37     0.27     0.14   34
Absolute value of the robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Hansen’s J: p-
value for the heteroskedasticity-consistent Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, with the null hypothesis being the restrictions 
are valid. Wald test: p-values of the F-statistic for joint insignificance of the eliminated control variables, with the null hypothesis 
being they are jointly insignificant.
Table 5. SOE, Political Ideology, Income Inequality – Cross-Sectional Data - 2SLS Estimations - Discrete Wing Measure 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) (9) 
  Dependent Var: SOEGDP  Dependent Var: NONAG  Dependent Var: SOEINV 
Constant 6.060  60.372  27.264  -5.911  43.072  12.467 2.050 30.878  33.587 
 (0.46)  (1.52)  (1.25)  (0.46)  (0.90) (0.51)  (0.29)  (3.61)***  (3.58)*** 
GINI -0.108  -2.793  -3.771  0.512  -2.787 -2.925  0.158  -1.105 -1.207 
 (0.16)  (1.56)  (2.08)**  (0.77)  (1.28) (1.83)*  (0.41)  (2.75)***  (2.86)*** 
GINI
2  0.003 0.038  0.048 -0.004 0.038 0.040  -0.001  0.014 0.014 
 (0.35)  (1.83)*  (2.27)**  (0.50)  (1.17) (0.93)  (0.17)  (2.94)***  (2.96)*** 
Left Wing  -21.604  -160.519  -110.024  -64.445 -183.038 -177.521 0.046 -23.823  -21.807 
 (0.40)  (3.18)***  (2.10)**  (1.30)  (3.01)*** (3.27)*** (0.00)  (1.82)*  (1.79)* 
Center Wing  2.321  -230.311  -137.777  22.937 -179.684 -163.098  5.560 -75.728  -60.398 
 (0.14)  (1.78)*  (1.97)**  (1.50)  (1.26) (2.31)**  (0.56)  (2.59)***  (2.86)*** 
Unspecified Wing  -69.112  -142.325  -98.917  -69.811 -180.891 -141.998 4.197 -21.154  -32.681 
 (1.37)  (2.24)**  (1.80)*  (0.95)  (2.05)** (1.83)*  (0.37) (1.12)  (2.39)** 
Left Wing  x GINI   1.240  7.771  6.380  3.131  9.005 8.920  0.164  1.419 1.287 
 (0.49)  (3.25)***  (2.84)***  (1.34)  (3.13)*** (3.43)*** (0.20) (2.41)**  (2.35)** 
Center Wing  x GINI  0.106  8.649  4.208  -0.919  9.283 8.473  -0.023  4.068 3.308 
 (0.13)  (1.59)  (2.64)***  (1.21)  (1.33) (2.47)**  (0.05)  (2.85)***  (3.17)*** 
Unspec. Wing  x GINI  3.380  7.602  7.483  3.645  8.872 7.456  -0.081  1.025 1.534 
 (1.47)  (2.64)***  (2.80)***  (1.09)  (2.23)** (2.07)**  (0.15) (1.21)  (2.59)*** 
Left Wing  x GINI
2    -0.012 -0.087  -0.073 -0.030  -0.099 -0.099  -0.003  -0.018 -0.016 
 (0.40)  (3.33)***  (2.98)***  (1.17)  (3.11)*** (3.45)*** (0.28)  (2.89)*** (2.74)*** 
Center Wing  x GINI
2 -0.005  -0.105  -0.053  0.007  -0.112 -0.102  -0.003  -0.051 -0.042 
 (0.53)  (1.65)*  (2.91)***  (0.74)  (1.38) (2.61)***  (0.57)  (3.10)***  (3.48)*** 
Unspec. Wing xGINI
2  -0.038 -0.087  -0.086 -0.042  -0.101 -0.088  -0.000  -0.012 -0.017 
 (1.56)  (2.80)***  (2.98)***  (1.18)  (2.38)** (2.26)**  (0.02) (1.36)  (2.70)*** 
Oil Exporter    22.615  19.237   22.759  21.362    3.635  2.624 
   (3.28)***  (2.64)***   (3.04)***  (2.71)***    (5.16)***  (4.16)*** 
Civil  Liberties  1970    0.486    0.926      -0.496   
   (0.51)      (0.72)      (1.99)**   
Small  island    -5.339    -7.134      -2.290   
   (0.81)      (0.86)      (1.87)*   
Urban Pop. 1970    -0.066      -0.088      -0.062  -0.072 
   (0.65)      (0.70)      (2.32)**  (3.36)*** 
East Asia and Pac.    -2.681      -6.689      3.180   
   (0.37)      (0.70)      (2.34)**   
M. East and N. Afr.    10.471 15.901    7.621  11.954    4.059  2.991 
   (2.08)**  (3.85)***    (1.13)  (2.81)***    (3.13)***  (2.72)*** 
South  Asia    -2.322      0.018    1.756  
    (0.37)      (0.00)     (0.97)  
Sub-Saharan  Afr.    -2.853    -3.934      1.629   
    (0.46)      (0.49)     (1.21)  
Latin Amer. and Car.    -7.050      -11.071  -10.147    -0.095   
   (1.24)      (1.42)  (2.61)***    (0.08)   
Observations  59 59  59 58  58  58  55  55  55 
Hansen's J  0.14  0.33  0.24  0.28  0.30 0.34  0.31  0.36 0.36 
Wald’s  test      0.45     0.62    0.46   35
 
 
Absolute value of the robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Hansen’s J: p-
value for the heteroskedasticity-consistent Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, with the null hypothesis being the restrictions 
are valid. Wald test: p-values of the F-statistic for joint insignificance of the eliminated control variables, with the null hypothesis of 
joint insignificance.
Table 6. SOE, Political Ideology, Income Inequality – Cross-Sectional Data - 2SLS Estimations - Unspecified Wing = Center Wing 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) (9) 
  Dependent Var: SOEGDP  Dependent Var: NONAG  Dependent Var: SOEINV 
Constant  71.512  102.067 117.817 79.591 63.961 59.056  18.272  16.310  3.927 
  (1.86)*  (2.10)** (2.67)*** (1.76)* (1.01) (1.38)  (1.71)*  (0.99)  (0.37) 
GINI  -3.483  -5.036 -6.029 -3.942  -4.659  -3.134 -0.718 -0.929 -6.483 
  (1.81)*  (2.13)** (2.69)*** (1.72)*  (1.56)  (1.43) (1.26) (1.54) (2.66)*** 
GINI
2  0.041  0.059 0.072 0.047  0.054  0.038 0.009 0.012 0.076 
  (1.88)*  (2.18)** (2.78)*** (1.80)*  (1.61)  (1.56) (1.37) (1.75)* (2.68)*** 
Left Wing  -152.632  -158.336 -182.472 -186.616  -179.622  -176.608 -31.981  -29.239 -217.610 
  (2.24)**  (2.80)*** (2.76)*** (2.42)**  (2.79)***  (2.28)** (1.83)*  (1.83)* (3.05)*** 
Center Wing  -155.930  -180.459 -199.299 -184.713  -204.625  -196.824 -46.319  -19.440 -251.405 
  (2.48)** (2.85)*** (2.65)***  (2.36)**  (2.41)**  (2.39)** (1.48)  (0.84) (3.22)*** 
Left Wing  x GINI   7.675  8.346 9.533 9.415  9.324  8.963 1.825 1.701 11.252 
  (2.33)**  (2.98)*** (3.00)*** (2.52)**  (2.87)***  (2.33)** (2.13)** (2.24)** (3.26)*** 
Center Wing  x GINI  7.555  8.741 10.009 9.208  9.806  9.362 2.212 1.041 12.267 
  (2.51)**  (3.14)*** (3.19)*** (2.43)**  (2.45)**  (2.39)** (1.53)  (0.97) (3.23)*** 
Left Wing  x GINI
2   -0.082  -0.094 -0.107 -0.101  -0.104  -0.098 -0.021 -0.021 -0.126 
  (2.29)**  (3.04)*** (3.07)*** (2.46)**  (2.86)***  (2.31)** (2.25)** (2.51)** (3.30)*** 
Center Wing  x GINI
2  -0.084  -0.098 -0.113 -0.103  -0.109  -0.104 -0.024 -0.013 -0.138 
  (2.51)**  (3.14)*** (3.21)*** (2.43)**  (2.48)**  (2.39)** (1.53)  (1.09) (3.23)*** 
Oil Exporter    19.610 17.989    19.161  20.241   4.025  4.241 
    (3.20)*** (2.70)***    (2.90)***  (2.44)**  (7.73)***  (7.47)*** 
Civil Liberties 1970    0.558     1.059  2.072  -0.193   
    (0.62)     (0.88)  (2.09)**   (0.80)   
Small island    -8.317     -11.089     -2.160  -1.461 
    (1.19)     (1.32)     (1.84)*  (2.18)** 
Urban Pop. 1970    -0.049     -0.100     -0.032   
    (0.61)     (0.98)     (1.24)   
East Asia and Pac.    3.956     1.437     0.964   
    (0.63)     (0.16)     (0.58)   
M. East and N. Afr.    11.943 13.556    9.680     0.266   
    (2.13)** (3.36)***    (1.30)     (0.54)   
South Asia    0.870     -0.064     1.084  2.352 
    (0.18)     (0.01)     (0.69)  (1.81)* 
Sub-Saharan Afr.    3.072     3.470     -0.571   
    (0.56)     (0.47)     (0.30)   
Latin Amer. and Car.    1.029     -0.293  -7.116  -2.188  -2.771 
    (0.20)     (0.04)  (2.04)**   (1.20)  (2.88)*** 
Observations  59  59 59 58 58 58  55  55 55 
Hansen's J  0.77  0.69 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.73  0.58  0.34 0.50 
Wald’s test     0.33      0.38     0.79   36
Absolute value of the robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Hansen’s J: p-
value for the heteroskedasticity-consistent Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, with the null hypothesis being the restrictions 
are valid. Wald test: p-values of the F-statistic for joint insignificance of the eliminated control variables, with the null hypothesis 
referring to joint insignificance. 
Table 7. Panel (Pooled Cross-Sections) Results - GMM Estimation  
  Dependent Variable: SOEINV 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)  (9) 
  Continuous WING Measure  Discrete WING Measure  Unspecified WING = Center WING 
GINI 0.599  -0.097  -0.096  0.499  -0.115 -0.112 0.664 0.000  0.001 
  (5.83)***  (2.45)**  (2.50)*** (5.36)*** (3.48)*** (3.43)***  (3.57)***  (0.06)  (0.016) 
GINI
2  -0.005 0.001  0.001 -0.004 0.001  0.001 -0.006 0.000  0.000 
  (4.84)*** (3.88)***  (3.98)*** (4.51)*** (5.36)*** (5.33)***  (4.10)***  (1.09)  (1.22) 
Left Wing  -1.838  -8.921  -8.978  -7.867 -10.259 -10.201 -0.892  -6.490  -6.577 
 (0.62)  (7.86)***  (8.25)***  (3.77)***  (11.51)*** (11.88)***  (0.21)  (3.47)***  (3.62)*** 
Center Wing  13.088  6.197  6.014  6.941  1.228 1.233  -10.801  -3.581  -3.581 
 (4.17)***  (5.89)***  (8.08)***  (2.69)***  (1.44) (1.51)  (1.96)*  (1.70)*  (1.80)* 
Unspecified Wing  -5.162  -13.706  -13.687 -5.748 -12.368 -12.218       
 (1.14)  (7.74)***  (8.11)***  (1.51)  (7.29)***  (7.57)***       
Left Wing  x GINI   0.253  0.614  0.617 0.519 0.649  0.647 0.228 0.495  0.499 
  (1.76)*  (11.04)*** (11.51)*** (3.77)*** (14.61)*** (15.12)***  (1.18)  (5.42)***  (5.68)*** 
Center Wing  x GINI  -0.520  -0.233  -0.223 -0.235 -0.002  -0.001 0.738  0.252  0.251 
 (-3.57)***  (4.39)***  (4.54)***  (4.99)**  (0.05) (0.03)  (2.78)***  (2.51)**  (2.65)*** 
Unspec. Wing  x GINI  0.493  0.706  0.700 0.501 0.647  0.641       
  (2.29)**  (8.61)***  (9.10)*** (2.80)*** (8.44)***  (8.83)***       
Left Wing  x GINI
2    -0.003 -0.008  -0.008 -0.006 -0.008  -0.008 -0.003 -0.006  -0.006 
  (2.13)**  (12.51)*** (13.15)*** (4.13)*** (15.77)*** (16.34)***  (1.57)  (6.31)***  (6.68)*** 
Center Wing  x GINI
2  0.005 0.002  0.002 0.002 0.000  0.000 -0.009 -0.003 -0.003 
 (3.33)***  (4.25)***  (4.40)***  (1.71)*  (0.17) (0.12)  (3.06)***  (2.75)****  (2.90)*** 
Unspec. Wing xGINI
2  -0.006 -0.008  -0.008 -0.006 -0.007  -0.007       
  (2.75)*** (8.94)***  (9.50)*** (3.31)*** (9.05)***  (9.53)***       
Oil  Exporter   4.034  4.048  4.083  4.093  4.035  4.074 
    (29.2)***  (29.67)***  (32.59)***  (32.85)***  (23.63)***  (25.32)*** 
Civil Liberties 1970    -0.920  -0.917  -0.876  -0.873  -0.853  -0.856 
   (49.75)***  (52.47)***  (49.75)***  (51.08)***  (30.94)***  (32.96)*** 
Small  island    0.065     0.026     0.074   
    (0.67)     (0.32)     (0.61)   
Urban Pop. 1970    1.102  1.102  1.112  1.112  1.388  1.338 
   (8.52)***  (9.06)***  (8.86)***  (9.03)***  (8.47)***  (8.62)*** 
East Asia and Pac.    0.225  0.235  0.209  0.217  0.021   
    (3.7)***  (3.87)***  (3.85)***  (4.01)***   (0.23)   
M. East and N. Afr.    0.531  0.525  0.554  0.551  0.350  0.327 
   (3.74)***  (3.74)***  (4.03)***  (4.01)***  (2.005)**  (2.04)** 
South Asia    0.632  0.643   0.613  0.627  0.487  0.453 
   (7.29)***  (7.29)***  (8.54)***  (9.12)***  (3.86)***  (4.87)*** 
Sub-Saharan Afr.    0.475  0.502  0.534  0.551  0.172   
   (3.10)***  (3.34)***  (3.67)***  (4.03)***   (0.80)   
Latin Amer. and Car.    -1.046  -1.030  -1.122  -1.112  -1.388  -1.379 
   (12.40)***  (12.55)***  (14.02)***  (13.88)***   (8.53)***  (12.49)*** 
Constant 1975  -8.268  12.162  12.132  -5.851 12.472 12.387  -10.100 9.366  9.374 
 (3.75)***  (14.38)***  (14.7)***  (2.82)***  (16.92)*** (17.01)*** (3.57)***  (6.40)***  (6.80)*** 
Constant 1980  -7.408  12.803  12.767  -5.012 13.118 13.031 -8.990  9.997  10.009 
  (3.33)*** (14.97)***  (15.32)*** (2.41)** (17.62)*** (17.75)*** (3.57)***  (6.83)***  (7.25)*** 
Constant 1985  -9.201  11.585  11.555  -5.978 11.792 11.707 -9.755  8.826  8.835 
  (3.72)*** (13.55)*** (13.78)*** (2.41)*** (15.71)*** (15.78)*** (3.13)***  (6.12)***  (6.50)*** 
Constant 1990  -8.247  10.766  10.735  -6.698 11.121 11.036  -10.678 7.943  7.956 
  (4.11)*** (12.70)*** (12.98)*** (2.90)*** (14.72)*** (14.78)*** (3.38)***  (5.45)***  (5.80)*** 
Constant 1995  -10.414  10.093  10.053  -7.922 10.389 10.296  -11.964 7.317  7.311 
  (4.65)*** (11.77)*** (11.98)*** (3.81)*** (13.72)*** (13.77)*** (3.69)***  (4.93)***  (5.22)*** 
Constant 2000  -11.862  8.531  8.495  -9.385  8.804 8.713  -13.572  5.732 5.734 
 (5.41)***  (10.42)***  (10.6)***  (4.52)***  (11.75)*** (11.78)*** (4.75)***  (3.91)***  (1.37)*** 
Hansen's J  0.89  0.72  0.73  0.81 0.71  0.70 0.82 0.75  0.71 





Absolute value of the robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Hansen’s J: p-
value for the heteroskedasticity-consistent Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, with the null hypothesis being the restrictions 
are valid. Wald test: p-values of the F-statistic for joint insignificance of the eliminated control variables, with the null hypothesis 
referring to joint insignificance. 
Table 8a. SOEs and Democracy vs. Dictatorship (Sample Average of Democracy) – 2SLS Estimations 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)  (9) 
  Dependent Var: SOEGDP  Dependent Var: NONAG  Dependent Var: SOEINV 
Constant  58.515 70.441  49.853 39.310 60.313  39.292 15.201  6.544  1.886 
  (1.11)  (1.70)* (1.03) (0.61) (1.12)  (0.66) (0.97) (0.37)  (0.10) 
GINI  -2.666 -3.404  -2.206 -1.798 -2.647 -1.781 -0.397 0.280  0.242 
  (1.01) (1.61)  (0.89) (0.54) (0.96)  (0.57) (0.50) (0.31)  (0.23) 
GINI
2  0.029 0.039  0.022 0.019 0.027  0.017 0.005 -0.004 -0.001 
  (0.92) (1.42)  (0.72) (0.46) (0.76)  (0.44) (0.46) (0.36)  (0.11) 
Democracy  -12.677  -23.457 -10.801 -3.625 -10.752  -4.045  -5.483  -5.279  -4.455 
  (0.65) (1.32)  (0.59) (0.16) (0.56)  (0.19) (1.08) (1.02)  (0.86) 
Democracy*GINI  0.728 1.172  0.596 0.420 0.720  0.399 0.254 0.161  0.178 
  (0.83) (1.49)  (0.70) (0.40) (0.82)  (0.40) (1.13) (0.67)  (0.70) 
Democracy*GINI
2 -0.008 -0.013  -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.84) (1.44)  (0.63) (0.43) (0.80)  (0.37) (1.07) (0.40)  (0.59) 
Oil  Exporter   23.208  21.329  19.656  20.311   4.434  5.292 
   (3.04)***  (2.96)***   (2.55)**  (2.98)***  (3.26)***  (4.05)*** 
Small  Island    -1.962     -3.521    -1.089  
   (0.36)     (0.55)     (1.05)   
Urban  Pop.  1970   0.019     -0.052    -0.037  
   (0.20)     (0.48)     (1.57)   
East Asia and Pac.    -0.352      -4.409      1.067   
   (0.08)     (0.84)     (0.56)   
South  Asia    0.177     -9.209    2.428  
   (0.03)     (1.05)     (1.18)   
Sub-Saharan  Afr.   -1.470     -5.754     -1.786  -3.610 
   (0.25)     (0.98)     (1.12)  (2.88)*** 
Latin Amer. and Car.    12.045      2.450      2.879   
   (2.34)**      (0.30)      (1.77)*   
M. East and N. Afr.    12.011  12.229    10.905  11.034       
   (2.33)**  (2.59)***   (2.12)**  (2.23)**      
Observations  59 59  59 58 58  58 55 55  55 
Hansen’s  J  test  0.35 0.36  0.29 0.27 0.23  0.19 0.33 0.25  0.22 




Absolute value of the robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Hansen’s J: p-
value for the heteroskedasticity-consistent Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, with the null hypothesis being the restrictions 
are valid. Wald test: p-values of the F-statistic for joint insignificance of the eliminated control variables, with the null hypothesis 
referring to joint insignificance. 
Table 8b. SOEs and Democracy vs. Dictatorship (Initial Levels of Democracy) – 2SLS Estimations 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)  (9) 
  Dependent Var: SOEGDP  Dependent Var: NONAG  Dependent Var: SOEINV 
Constant  85.595 88.224 104.188  77.781 90.808  84.009  3.284  21.909  19.311 
 (2.21)**  (2.14)**  (2.46)**  (1.76)*  (1.83)*  (1.90)*  (0.17)  (0.99)  (0.91) 
GINI  -4.338 -4.983  -5.428 -3.921 -4.918 -4.419 0.088 -0.965 -0.819 
 (2.12)**  (2.12)**  (2.35)**  (1.64)  (1.77)*  (1.81)*  (0.08)  (0.80)  (0.70) 
GINI
2  0.055 0.069  0.072 0.049 0.068  0.060 0.000 0.015  0.013 
 (2.08)**  (2.19)**  (2.40)**  (1.57)  (1.83)*  (1.87)*  (0.03)  (0.96)  (0.86) 
Democracy  -21.931 -27.280  -34.858 -21.545 -37.869  -33.912  -1.046  -5.170  -3.740 
  (1.49) (2.38)**  (2.75)***  (1.29) (2.40)**  (2.19)** (0.22)  (1.18)  (0.85) 
Democracy*GINI  1.160 1.419  1.700 1.178 1.866  1.695 0.062 0.261  0.199 
  (1.87)* (2.43)**  (3.02)***  (1.68)* (2.52)** (2.50)**  (0.27)  (1.19)  (0.89) 
Democracy*GINI
2 -0.014 -0.017  -0.020 -0.014 -0.021 -0.019 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
  (2.23)**  (2.51)**  (3.22)*** (2.02)** (2.61)*** (2.74)***  (0.32)  (1.25)  (0.98) 
Oil  Exporter   27.698  26.336  28.531  29.024   5.546  5.144 
   (3.45)***  (3.08)***  (3.29)***  (2.64)***  (4.07)***  (4.41)*** 
Small  Island    -3.257     -4.728    -0.664  
   (0.55)     (0.69)     (0.42)   
Urban  Pop.  1970    0.046     0.021    0.005  
   (0.35)     (0.13)     (0.20)   
East Asia and Pac.    -1.379      -2.230      1.360   
   (0.25)     (0.36)     (0.84)   
South  Asia   3.209     6.319     3.592  2.955 
   (0.54)     (0.73)      (2.11)**  (2.74)*** 
Sub-Saharan Afr.    -1.329      -11.346      1.052  2.470 
   (0.24)     (1.49)     (0.58)  (2.26)** 
Latin Amer. and Car.    -9.551  -8.614    9.433  -11.727    -2.858  -2.919 
   (1.17)  (2.18)**   (1.28)  (2.35)**    (2.22)**  (2.71)*** 
M. East and N. Afr.    9.673  11.440    11.162      3.311  3.046 
   (1.36)  (1.89)*   (1.62)      (1.98)**  (1.94)* 
Observations  59 59  59 58 58  58 55 55  55 
Hansen’s  J  0.50 0.30  0.26 0.27 0.22  0.32 0.35 0.26  0.18 
Wald’s  test     0.47     0.61    0.39   39
 
 
Absolute value of the robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Hansen’s J: p-
value for the heteroskedasticity-consistent Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, with the null hypothesis being the restrictions 
are valid. Wald test: p-values of the F-statistic for joint insignificance of the eliminated control variables, with the null hypothesis 
referring to joint insignificance. 
 
 
Table 9. SOEs and Employment Protection,– Cross-Sectional Data - 2SLS Estimations - Continuous Wing Measure
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9)
  Dependent Var: SOEGDP Dependent Var: NONAG Dependent Var: SOEINV
Constant 97.16  108.907  107.052  98.29 102.580 66.75  26.25  27.304 25.381 
 (44.97)**  (3.95)***  (3.43)***  (57.91)*  (2.95)*** (38.65)*  (11.19)** (3.34)*** (2.17)** 
GINI  -4.698 -5.035  -5.120 -4.566  -4.501 -2.641  -0.962 -1.022 -1.161 
  (2.181)** (3.65)***  (3.18)***  (2.835)  (2.59)*** (2.068)  (0.553)* (2.57)**  (1.93)* 
GINI
2  0.054 0.059  0.061  0.0524 0.053 0.032 0.0117 0.012 0.014 
 (0.025)**  (3.66)***  (3.28)***  (0.0324)  (2.62)*** (0.024) (0.00633)*  (2.68)***  (2.02)** 
Left Wing  -141.6 -143.937  -160.088 -166.2  -148.664 -108.3  -24.50  -21.717 -16.390 
  (53.38)*** (3.17)*** (2.87)***  (64.97)**  (2.57)** (59.83)*  (17.38)  (2.08)**  (1.02) 
Center Wing  -250.3 -265.302  -43.807  -444.1  380.945 59.37  -48.76 -88.069  -92.074 
  (112.6)** (1.68)*  (0.44)  (738.0)  (0.65) (492.2) (51.27)  (2.02)**  (2.95)*** 
Unspecified Wing  -169.2 -137.772  -211.049 -194.5  -138.711 182.6  -4.974  -7.630  -3.588 
  (66.14)** (3.11)***  (3.66)*** (89.20)**  (2.42)** (71.06)**  (22.26)  (0.54)  (0.19) 
Left Wing x GINI   7.577 7.792  8.232 8.773  8.025 5.873  1.461 1.446 1.240 
  (2.615)*** (3.65)*** (3.06)*** (3.223)***  (2.94)*** (3.010)*  (0.814)* (3.00)***  (1.66)* 
Cen. Wingx GINI  12.20 13.097  2.750  21.28 -18.388 -2.861  2.714  4.554  4.738 
  (5.256)** (1.80)*  (0.59)  (35.40)  (0.65) (23.83) (2.465)  (2.15)**  (3.09)*** 
Uns. Wingx GINI  8.217 7.010  10.088  9.492  7.152 8.495  0.331 0.568 0.354 
  (3.112)*** (3.32)*** (3.73)***  (4.141)**  (2.56)** (3.340)**  (1.032)  (0.85)  (0.39) 
Left Wingx GINI
2   -0.086 -0.088  -0.092  -0.0985 -0.090 -0.0653 -0.0180 -0.018  -0.016 
  (0.029)*** (3.79)*** (3.14)*** (0.036)***  (3.05)*** (0.034)*  (0.00872)**  (3.52)*** (2.08)** 
Cnt Wing x GINI
2  -0.140 -0.150  -0.032 -0.242  0.216 0.0355 -0.0344 -0.054 -0.056 
  (0.060)** (1.82)*  (0.60)  (0.407)  (0.67) (0.276)  (0.0289)  (2.16)**  (3.04)*** 
Uns. WingxGINI
2  -0.093 -0.082  -0.112 -0.108  -0.084 -0.093  -0.00475  -0.008 -0.005 
  (0.034)*** (3.46)*** (3.79)*** (0.0453)**  (2.66)*** (0.037)**  (0.0113)  (1.13)  (0.53) 
Oil Exporter  18.69 17.983  18.257 18.20  16.914 17.50  3.199  2.143  2.315 
  (6.153)*** (3.96)*** (2.86)*** (6.590)***  (3.33)*** (5.625)*** (0.644)*** (2.69)***  (3.14)*** 
Civil Liberties  0.587 -0.065    1.132  -0.144    -0.507 -0.325   
  (0.963) (0.08)    (1.340)  (0.13)    (0.263)** (1.24)   
Small island  -9.226 -8.527    -11.89 -10.265 -10.24 -3.072 -3.937  -3.108 
  (7.422) (1.86)*    (8.695)  (1.88)* (5.598)* (1.345)** (2.45)**  (2.86)*** 
Urban Pop. 1970  -0.0614 0.021    -0.117  -0.006    -0.0357 -0.015   
 (0.0830)  (0.42)    (0.107)  (0.09)    (0.0240)  (0.79)   
British Legal Origin    8.498  6.449    8.669  7.513    3.760  3.185 
   (2.61)***  (2.36)**    (1.96)**  (3.624)**    (4.90)***  (3.28)*** 
German Legal Orig.    4.692  9.014    4.674      1.189   
   (1.08)  (2.42)**    (0.89)      (1.17)   
Scandinavian Leg.    2.263      2.714      -0.190   
   (0.68)      (0.73)      (0.21)   
Proportionality   -0.085      -0.078     -0.027   
   (0.95)      (0.64)      (1.14)   
Tenure of Democ.    0.567      1.113      0.245   
   (0.59)      (0.97)      (0.76)   
Comp. of Democ.    -1.902  -1.451    -2.363  -2.240    -0.348   
   (2.83)***  (1.90)*    (3.00)***  (0.899)**    (1.76)*   
Regional Effects  YES YES  YES YES  YES  YES  YES  YES YES 
Observations 59  54  59  58  53  58  55  52  55 
Hansen’s J  0.77  0.23  0.29  0.67 0.34 0.77  0.14 0.17 0.37 
Wald’s test      0.41      0.44      0.19 